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ABSTRACT 
This project investigates the response of the U.S. Navy (USN) and Military Sealift 
Command (MSC) to different types of natural disasters and identifies the types of assets 
deployed as well as the dwell times for those assets.  Using the recent history of USN 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, we explore opportunities 
to shape the fleet force structure to adapt to the increased mission importance of HADR 
operations, and we identify current hard power assets that may be effective in achieving 
soft power goals. 
By analyzing disaster characteristics and USN platform capabilities, we can 
determine which assets are better suited for mission requirements brought on by disasters. 
Knowing the best possible asset to assign to a disaster will improve the DoD’s 
effectiveness in regaining stability, both monetarily and logistically, within the affected 
region when disasters occur.  Further, understanding which assets are better suited for 
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On Tuesday, January 12, 2010, at 4:53 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Haiti suffered 
a catastrophic, magnitude-7.0 earthquake that lasted 35 seconds.  Its epicenter was near 
the town of Léogâne, approximately 16 miles west of Port-au-Prince, Haiti’s capital, as 
shown in Figure 1 (Aymat, 2010).  By January 24, at least 52 aftershocks measuring 
magnitude 4.5 or greater had been recorded.  The earthquake left over 200,000 dead, over 
250,000 injured, and over 1.1 million homeless (Aymat, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1. Haiti Earthquake Epicenter and Effective Range 
(Aymat, 2010) 
Such disasters call for large, fast, coordinated response efforts.  In support of the 
earthquake, the U.S. Navy deployed over 29 ships, including USNS Comfort (a hospital 
ship), six U.S. Coast Guard vessels, two Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARGs), two 
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
personnel, and a Port Security Unit (PSU).  This is just one of the most recent examples 
of the U.S. Navy’s increasing involvement in disaster relief efforts around the world 
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For the Navy, there are difficulties unique to disaster response that stem from the 
dynamic nature of the operations as well as the use of military forces for what has 
historically been a nontraditional mission set.  It is difficult to predict exactly where the 
next disaster may strike, and it is equally difficult to predict the magnitude of any given 
disaster.  In addition to the uncertainty that disasters present, humanity is also facing a 
world in which the number of disasters reported each year is increasing.  Figure 2 shows 




Figure 2. Natural Disasters 1975–2009 
(EM-DAT, 2011) 
The causes of the increase in disasters include an increase in population, resulting 
in a larger spread of the populated areas, and an increase in the reporting of smaller 
disasters.  The unique difficulties that disasters pose, combined with the increase in their 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) has been involved in disaster response in the 
past, but now it has decided to take a leading role in disaster response efforts throughout 
the globe and, as a result, has become a leader in initial response efforts.  As a major 
component of the DoD, the U.S. Navy (USN) has assumed a large portion of the 
responsibility.  Through the use of surface ships, the DoD can quickly deploy high 
quantities of relief aid to affected areas in a matter of weeks.  The supply line power that 
the USN possesses is essential in reducing the post-disaster turmoil and easing the “gap 
of pain”
1
 (Cuculo, 2006).  The gap of pain refers to the time period between when 
domestic relief efforts are exhausted and when outside relief efforts arrive.  The goal for 
the DoD, and specifically the USN, is to at least reduce, if not close, this gap of pain by 
having ready ships on standby in nearby areas.  The USN refers to its relief operations as 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.   
A growing interest in HADR efforts from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
(2010) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Admiral Mike Mullen (2007) 
calls for an in-depth analysis of past disaster relief efforts to improve future relief efforts.  
Admiral Mullen (2011) recently directed military leadership to focus on developing 
response capabilities to handle problems created by increasing populations in coastal 
areas and the weak abilities of Third World countries to respond to natural disasters.  As 
part of a U.S. collaboration to exercise control over the high seas, the USN, the U.S. 
Marine Corps (USMC), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have joined efforts to support 
a variety of missions to include HADR (DoN, 2010).  The DoD’s recognition of the 
importance of maritime efforts in HADR  operations is evidenced in the following 
statement by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (15th CNO):  
For in this modern world, the instruments of warfare are not solely for 
waging war. Far more importantly, they are the means for controlling 
peace. Naval officers must therefore understand not only how to fight a 
war, but how to use the tremendous power which they operate to sustain a 
world of liberty and justice, without unleashing the powerful instruments 
                                                 
1 The term gap of pain was borrowed from a PowerPoint briefing given by Army Brigadier General 
Anthony Cuculo on the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Brig Gen Cuculo is the Commander of the 
Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned (JCOA), a subordinate organization of U.S. 
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of destruction and chaos that they have at their command. (DoN,  2010, p. 
43) 
HADR operations have become the leading other than war (OTW) mission 
executed by the USN.  Over the past decade, the USN has been essential in the relief 
efforts of the Haitian earthquake, the Indonesian tsunami, and Hurricane Katrina, to name 
a few.  Its involvement has helped provide millions of tons of medical supplies and food, 
gallons of fresh water, and personnel to assist those affected by the disasters.  While these 
examples can be viewed as a success, there have been instances where the Navy could 
have performed better.  On November 15, 2007, Bangledesh was ravaged by Cyclone 
Sidr, the equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane, which caused over 10,000 deaths and over 
$450 million in damages.  In response, the USN decided to send one of its Guided 
Missile Destroyers (DDG), which was in the vicinity and on which one of this study’s 
authors, LT Ingram, served.  The problem the DDG had was its inability to get within 
close range of Bangledesh.  Due to draft constraint and the gradual slope of the 
Bangledesh coastline, the DDG could approach no closer than 25 miles from the 
shoreline, out of visible range.  In addition to the distance restrictions, the DDG was not 
outfitted with a helicopter; it could not produce enough water to supply victims or 
hospitals ashore; it did not have excess food or medical supplies to provide; and, 
ultimately, it had no way of assisting the devastated country.  It was not until two days 
later, when a Landing Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA) arrived on station, that the USN 
could provide HADR support.   
Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are required to juggle time, space, and force 
considerations to execute all missions, and the uncertainty of the environment and 
requirements of HADR operations only increases the complexity of the planning and 
response process (Preston, 2010).  As illustrated in the previous paragraph, the USN has 
often been very responsive in an effort to provide HADR support; however, there are 
several lessons learned and improvements that can be made to the process.  In the future, 
the USN plans on becoming more involved in HADR operations, according to Bruce A. 
Elleman, a naval historian: 
During the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the very 
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humanitarian aid, as opposed to cutting off and starving an enemy’s 
supply lines, would have seemed alien. In the twenty-first century, 
however, national power and prestige are more and more characterized by 
“soft power.” UNIFIED ASSISTANCE showed that “hard power” assets 
like aircraft carriers can also be the best providers of “soft power.” (2007, 
p. 45) 
To become more effective in HADR operations, the USN will need to understand 
what asset will be best in responding to specific disasters.  The assumption that the 
closest asset is best will not lead to a suitable or effective utilization of resources.  There 
must be a systematic approach to the method in which assets are deployed in support of 
the HADR mission. 
The USN is a global leader in disaster relief efforts, particularly because it owns 
multiple assets that have several capabilities that are unique and extremely useful in relief 
efforts.  Beyond asset capability, the validity of the mission helps to “solidify existing 
partnerships with key nations and open access to new relationships between and among 
nations, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations” (Stavridis, 
2010).  The largest benefit that the USN provides is the ability to traverse the sea.  With a 
large number of the world’s population living in close proximity to the coastline, the 
USN has the ability to access these areas better than any other service or agency.  The 
size and funding of the USN makes it the leading U.S. organization to take on disaster 
relief efforts.  HADR is a dynamic and unpredictable mission that the USN conducts, 
which poses a large scale of difficulty. 
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Creating a coherent national strategy for dealing with HADR operations requires 
addressing a variety of issues, including interagency relationships, the role of the military 
in humanitarian aid, and the delicate link between aid and foreign policy goals (USAID, 
2002).  The USN has acknowledged HADR competency as one of the core capabilities 
required for the successful implementation of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower (DoN, 2007), adopted by the leaders of the USN, USMC, and USCG.  The 
main purpose of this project is to gain more insight with respect to which USN and 
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understanding of this matching will help the USN make more effective decisions in 
planning and executing HADR operations throughout the world.   
Although this project is useful to the DoD in its ability to prepare for and conduct 
HADR operations, this project does have limitations in its scope.  The main limitation of 
the project is its inability to predict the nature or frequency of disasters.  The 
unpredictable nature of disasters is what poses the greatest challenge to the HADR 
process.  Without the knowledge of when or where a disaster may occur, it becomes 
difficult to predict needs and dedicate assets.  While engaged in two overseas wars and 
numerous operations throughout the world, the USN and MSC face difficulties in setting 
aside assets as “standby” units waiting for a disaster to occur.  While the frequency of 
global disasters is increasing, where and when disasters may occur is still to a large extent 
uncertain.  The goal is to determine which U.S. Navy assets are best suited for a specific 
disaster, based on the uniqueness of the disaster and capabilities and limitations of the 
assets.  Knowing the best possible asset to assign to a disaster will improve the DoD’s 
effectiveness in regaining stability, both monetarily and logistically, within the affected 
region as disasters occur, and knowing which assets are best suited for disaster response 
will help the USN with future force structure and fleet composition.  Above all, we hope 
to improve the HADR process in order to alleviate some of the hardship that is brought 
on by disasters. 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, we examine the history of HADR operations, noting the 
characteristics of the disasters and, more importantly, the response to the disasters.  By 
studying the response, we hope to understand the organization in the response.  We 
identify those naval assets that were deployed as part of the response and evaluate 
whether the asset deployed had capabilities that were well matched to the disaster type 
and its effects.  In this project, we did not look for the reason that a certain asset was sent; 
rather, we strictly input the raw data of the assets that were sent.  Additionally, we 
gathered historical data from three significant and recent disasters and compiled it into 
multiple matrices in order to gauge the effect of the disasters and response to the same.  
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 Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), 
 Hurricane Katrina (2005), and 
 Haiti earthquake (2010). 
Data collection was comprised of the following information: 
 Disaster types and characteristics, 
 Specified disaster intensity/scale, 
 Effects on the local population and infrastructure, 
 Humanitarian aid requested/needed, 
 Identification of standard HADR missions and operational requirements, 
 Asset deployment in HADR operations, 
 Duration of USN HADR operations, 
 USN and MSC platform characteristics, and 
 Platform capabilities and limitations in conducting identified HADR 
missions. 
The tables and notes, created from the data we gathered, helped us discover 
unique and specific circumstances in operations.  The tables and notes also allowed us to 
determine asset utilization, effectiveness of the mission, lessons learned, and 
improvements to the process, as well as limiting factors (e.g., physical or political 
barriers) to a specific disaster.   
The next step in this research process was to classify disasters and search for 
patterns.  The goal was to determine whether any patterns existed in response effort 
utility.  We discuss all patterns of utility that exist in the analyses and conclusion of the 
project.  In addition to discussing discovered patterns, we make recommendations as to 
platform utility for certain disaster characteristics.  If patterns did not exist, we performed 
a cause and effect analysis of the responses to the disasters and determined if 
improvements could be recommended.  We have compiled what we determined to be the 
most important aspect of a disaster, and we make recommendations on how to best 
address these disasters in the future.  We also make recommendations on how to further 
develop the research or situational awareness of HADR operations by discussing the 
limitations of the project. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This study is broken down into six chapters.  Chapter I is the introduction and 
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methodology and provided a brief overview of the current situation and a layout for the 
remainder of the report.  In Chapter II, we review the literature on U.S. Navy responses to 
HADR.  In Chapter III, we describe the methodology we used for collecting and 
analyzing data.  Chapter IV is a compilation of the empirical data.  In Chapter V, we 
analyze the data we gathered, and this is followed by a conclusion.  In the conclusion, we 
summarize the trends we discovered in our analysis of the gathered data, make 
suggestions regarding force structure and best practices, and provide recommendations 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to form a meaningful understanding of the field of HADR, it is first 
necessary to understand the definitions used in the field. Through a thematic analysis of 
the literature, we define the field of HADR and then analyze overall trends. 
There are a few recurring themes in the literature: difficulties of interagency 
collaboration, difficulties of military and civil interaction, and the need for further 
quantitative and qualitative research. 
A. DISASTERS 
1. FEMA Definition 
To understand the USN approach to HADR operations, we must first understand 
the types of disasters to which it responds.  A leading source for disaster information is 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  According to FEMA, a disaster 
must result in a minimum of 100 deaths/injuries or result in over $1 million worth of 
damage (FEMA, 2010).  Also according to FEMA, there must be some form of 
substantial damage or high impact in order for relief efforts to be granted.  The nature of 
disasters can be further analyzed through a data collection such as the International 
Disaster Database, known as EM-DAT.  The EM-DAT website, run by the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), is an active database that collects 
pertinent information on every disaster and compiles all the data into one central location 
(EM-DAT, 2011).  Similar to FEMA, the CRED uses specific criteria to determine what 
events qualify as disasters.  At least one of the following criteria must be met for an event 
to be entered into the EM-DAT database: at least 10 people killed, at least 100 people 
reported affected, a state of emergency declared, or a call for international assistance 
made (EM-DAT, 2011).  The EM-DAT website also contains numerous graphs, maps, 
and articles relating to both specific and nonspecific disasters around the world.  The 
FEMA and EM-DAT websites and available Navy records were our source in 
establishing which disasters we would research and analyze to determine the level of 
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2. Recent History of Disasters 
Access to information on the impact of disasters, such as deaths, injuries, and 
damage costs, is a relatively new development.  Traditionally, information on disasters 
was gathered at the time of the emergency.  The importance of the response effort often 
outweighed the importance of collecting information, so the quality and quantity of 
reported disaster information suffered (EM-DAT, 2011). 
The severity of the problem posed by natural disasters is obvious; excluding 
epidemics, from 1974 to 2003, there were 6,367 natural disasters resulting in more than 
two million deaths and damages of approximately $1.38 trillion.  Narrowing the scope of 
impact, from 1993 to 2003, Asia suffered 75% of the deaths resulting from natural 
disasters (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt, & Hoyois, 2004).  More recent data shows 373 natural 
disasters recorded in the year 2010 alone, resulting in 296,800 deaths, 207 million 
adversely affected people, and approximately $109 billion in damage.  Even though the 
Americas suffered 75% of the deaths caused by natural disasters in 2010, Asia suffered 
almost 85% of natural disaster deaths in the last decade.2  Of the top ten disasters in 2010, 
ranked by the resulting number of deaths, six occurred in Asia, three in the Americas, and 
one in Africa.  In the decade from 2001 to 2010, there were four separate years where the 
death toll from natural disasters exceeded 100,000 people.  Examining deaths due to 
natural disaster reveals that 2010 was the third deadliest year in the last 40 years—
exceeded only by 1970, when a major cyclone hit Bangladesh, and 1983, when drought 
and famine struck Ethiopia (Guha-Sapir, 2011).  
3. Disaster Classification 
 Understanding the nature of HADR requires a consistent definition of both 
humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR).  To reach a common definition for 
these terms, it is necessary first to define what we mean by disaster.  FEMA’s definition 
clearly defines the outcome of a disaster but does nothing to categorize the nature of the 
                                                 
2 The 2010 earthquake in Haiti caused more than 222,000 deaths, making it four times worse than the 
next deadliest natural disaster of 2010, a heat wave in Russia, and about 75 times worse than the third 
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event.  Analysis of supply chains in humanitarian assistance goes further toward creating 
an understanding of the nature of a disaster by classifying disasters according to their 
speed and source (Van Wassenhove, 2006). 
Van Wassenhove’s (2006) classification structure is useful to logisticians because 
a more refined description of a disaster captures more of the implications and difficulties 
that will be faced in the response process.  For example, consider the differences between 
an earthquake and a hurricane.  An earthquake frequently provides responders with little 
to no warning that it will occur, while a hurricane forms far out in the ocean and is 
tracked by meteorologists for at least days before it strikes land and causes the damage 
required to classify as a disaster. 
While classifying disasters according to onset speed is more useful than simply 
defining the required outcome, there is still a significant piece of the picture missing.  An 
earthquake in San Francisco could collapse a single building and kill 100 people.  This 
qualifies as a disaster.  A famine in Africa is likely to kill more than 100 people and 
would also be considered a disaster.  However, the difference between the two disasters is 
easy to imagine.  A single collapsed building implies that the response efforts would be 
focused within a space smaller than a city block, while any response to a famine in Africa 
is likely to span at least the breadth of one whole country.   
Apte (2009) refined the classification of disasters beyond the framework 
suggested by Van Wassenhove (2006).  She included the nature of the location of the 
disaster, localized or dispersed, as well as the onset rate, to provide a more useful 
structure for classifying disasters to help consider the difficulties that may be associated 
with aid response (Apte, 2009).  Figure 3 shows the link between a disaster’s location 
























Figure 3. Classification of Disasters 
(Apte, 2009) 
Where a disaster fits into Apte’s framework can clarify some of the challenges 
planners will face when preparing for relief operations.  Localized disasters that strike 
slowly provide responders with more time to prepare and spread resources across a 
smaller area, which makes responding to these types of disasters much easier than 
responding to a dispersed disaster that occurred suddenly (Apte, 2009). 
B. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 
The academic literature is fairly consistent with respect to definitions of HA and 
DR.  Both HA and DR include operations designed to relieve suffering due to the 
occurrence of a disaster and to aid in recovery.  There is, however, a difference between 
the two terms.  A variety of academic literature suggests that DR is defined by its 
immediacy and HA is the provision of more long-term support to help alleviate suffering 
and aid in recovery (Apte, 2009; Kovacs & Spens, 2007; Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 
2009).  The United States’ National Security Strategy (Obama, 2010), the National 
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Staff [JCS], 2009), and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA, 2003) all have 
similar definitions for HA and DR, which they either state explicitly or imply. 
1. The HADR Life Cycle 
The literature clearly defines the required effect of a disaster in terms of damage 
and the different aspects of a disaster’s nature that allow it to be classified according to 
the difficulty associated with a response effort.  To create a full picture of the field of 
HADR, we must still consider the framework for analyzing a disaster management effort.  
Two early but seminal works (Long, 1997; Lee & Zbinden, 2003) provided an easy 
method of distinguishing between different operations in disaster management.  Both 
works recognize different stages of disaster management, characterized by both when the 
disaster occurs and when the response effort itself is carried out.  Kovacs and Spens 
(2007) went further by clearly defining the transitions between phases of disaster 
management. They stated that “different operations can be distinguished in the times 
before a disaster strikes (the preparation phase), instantly after a disaster (the immediate 
response phase) and in the aftermath of a natural disaster (the reconstruction phase)” 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007, p. 101), as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Phases of Disaster Relief Operations 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007) 
2. HADR Is Logistics Dependent 
 Strategists in the field of HADR are primarily concerned with the discipline of 
logistics.  Due to the inherent uncertainty involved in dealing with disaster response, all 
the standard problems facing commercial supply chains are amplified for HADR 
operations.  Errors in preparation and responsiveness of the humanitarian supply chain 
have far-reaching and long-lasting effects (Kovacs & Spens, 2007).  Discussion of Lee’s 
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private sector must have for success: it must be agile, adaptive, and aligned (Lee, 2006).  
Agility is needed to deal with uncertainty and risk, the ability to adapt is necessary in a 
rapidly changing operational environment, and alignment of the interests of all players in 
the supply chain is needed for smooth coordination (Lee, 2006).  Such features are more 
difficult within response supply chains.   
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) argued that agility is the critical characteristic most 
frequently missing from humanitarian aid supply chains.  Because goods are generally 
assigned to a specific destination at their supply chain source (such as when they are 
donated for a specific disaster relief effort), this introduces inflexibility from the 
beginning (Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006).  Since aid items are typically assigned a 
destination (consumer) at the very beginning of the humanitarian aid supply chain, the 
length of the chain itself and the diverse nature of the players inhibit agility.  Figure 5 
illustrates a typical flow of goods. 
 
Figure 5. A Typical Humanitarian Supply Chain 
(Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006) 
3. Challenges Resulting From the Diversity of Actors in HADR 
Operations 
HADR operations typically require contributions from a diverse pool of actors.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the DoD, the Department of State (DoS), 
foreign governments, private citizens, corporations, local partners, and aid recipients are 
all actors who can play roles in the humanitarian aid supply chain.  Lack of agility is not 
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communication (Tatham & Kovacs, 2010), coordination (Lawlor, Kraus, & Kwast, 
2008), responsibility handoffs (Pettit & Beresford, 2005; Henderson, 2007), consistent 
management practices, failure to incorporate lessons learned, inventory management, and 
information management (Apte, 2009) are just a few examples.  Figure 6 shows the 
complex nature of the humanitarian aid network. 
 
Figure 6. Actors in the Supply Network of Humanitarian Aid 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007) 
4. Modeling Disaster Management 
 There are many models for disaster management and recovery (McEntire, 2006).  
Considering disaster management from a “big picture” perspective—with only the most 
basic division between responsibilities, tasks, or phases—allowed us to see potential 
areas where different challenges might arise and helped us to determine the specific 
nature of the challenges that could be faced at different times and between different 
actors.  Haas, Kates, and Bowden (1977) put forth an early model that illustrated the 
different degrees of intensity of different actors in disaster management and the 
differences between phases of the relief effort over time.  This model was later modified 
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Figure 7. A Model of Emergency Recovery 
(Pettit & Beresford, 2005) 
Pettit and Beresford’s (2005) illustration of activity intensity in a disaster 
recovery process provides actors such as the military with the ability to easily gain a 
broad picture of when they will play a key role in the recovery process and what types of 
activities they will be contributing.  The Fritz Institute uses Haas, Kates, and Bowden’s 
model of emergency recovery to create its own illustration of the different phases a 
supply chain for humanitarian relief undergoes. This illustration is shown in Figure 8 
(Thomas, 2003). 
 
Figure 8. The Supply Chain for Humanitarian Relief 
(Thomas, 2003) 
Kovacs and Spens (2007) showed the different phases of disaster relief 
operations; Pettit and Beresford’s (2005) model of emergency recovery illustrated 
different phases for the recovery cycle and levels of activity; and Thomas’s (2003) 
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HADR operations.  These models, as well as Kovacs and Spens (2007), were all narrowly 
focused on small aspects of relief efforts and did not provide a structure for examining all 
aspects of HADR operations. 
Apte (2009) provided a structure for comparing disaster phases with 
corresponding logistics activities and time horizons. She also put forth the visual 
depiction for examining the humanitarian supply chain for the purpose of broad 
understanding within the context of a disaster time line (reproduced as follows in Figure 
9).  The Apte (2009) model provided a breakdown of pre- and post-disaster activities, 
























Figure 9. Time Line of the Humanitarian Supply Chain 
(Apte, 2009) 
C. THE MILITARY IN DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 
A Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a term used by the USMC to 
describe the principal organization for all missions across the range of military 
operations. A MAGTF is a balanced air-ground, combined-arms task organization of 
Marine Corps forces under a single commander and is structured to accomplish a specific 
mission.  A MAGTF with separate air-ground headquarters is normally formed for 
combat operations and training exercises.  The MAGTF contains substantial combat 
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of participating Marine forces (Simmons, 2003).  The command structure of a MAGTF is 
illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. MAGTF Structural Diagram 
(USMC, 2011) 
A Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is a MAGTF that is able to deploy rapidly 
and conduct operations across the spectrum, from HADR to amphibious assault and high-
intensity combat. A MEF comprises a MEF Headquarters Group, Marine Division, 
Marine Air Wing, and Marine Logistics Group. The three MEFs are as follows: 
 I Marine Expeditionary Force, located at Camp Pendleton, CA.  
 II Marine Expeditionary Force, located at Camp Lejeune, NC. 
 III Marine Expeditionary Force, located at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan.  
A Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is an operational formation of the United States Navy. 
It is composed of roughly 7,500 personnel, an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, a 
destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates, and a carrier air wing of 65–
70 aircraft. 
An Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is a group made up of amphibious ships, 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. An ESG allows Navy and Marine Corps forces to 
support a variety of operational missions. 
1. Background and Influences 
On December 26, 2004, an earthquake triggered a tsunami that devastated the 
southeastern Asian peninsula and surrounding islands.  A total of nine countries were 
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ships on station ready to assist the area, launching the largest HADR operation in the 
history of the USN: 
III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) was designated as the command 
element for Combined Support Force 536 to conduct Operation UNIFIED 
ASSISTANCE. Twenty-two U.S. ships, including the ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN Carrier Strike Group, BONHOMME RICHARD 
Expeditionary Strike Group, USS ESSEX, USS FORT MCHENRY with a 
special purpose MAGTF, USCGC MUNRO, USNS JOHN 
MCDONNELL and six maritime prepositioning ships were diverted from 
their scheduled routes to render aid that included subsistence, medical 
support, engineering support, port hydrographic surveys and extensive 
debris removal. U.S. naval forces did not work in isolation; their 
immediate response evolved into a multifaceted effort that included other 
Services, other agencies, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), other countries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 
private volunteer organizations. (DoN, 2010, p. 45) 
The relief efforts in the South Indian Ocean were just one example of many 
HADR operations in which the USN has participated over the past 40 years.  Between 
1970 and 2000, the U.S. has been involved in over 366 HADR missions, which is 
significant compared to the 22 combat missions that were conducted over the same time 
period.  Specifically, the USN has participated in relief efforts for disasters such as an 
earthquake in Pakistan, Hurricane Katrina, typhoons in the Philippines, a mudslide on the 
island of Leyte, a hurricane in Nicaragua, cyclones in Bangladesh, a bridge collapse in 
the United States, and recently, the earthquake in Haiti (DoN, 2010). 
 Apte (2009) and the Naval Operations Concept (DoN, 2010) discuss the 
expansion of the human population globally.  As the population expands, people continue 
to move toward littoral areas, creating a situation in which the risk of a natural disaster 
affecting these people increases.  Because of this phenomenon, there exists an ever-
increasing need for the naval forces to respond and conduct HADR operations.  In 
addition, CCDRs have increased their HADR operations to provide an area of 
responsibility (AOR) that is safer, more stable, and better secured.  The view of the DoD 
is that the HADR operations conducted by the USN not only help those in need but also 
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A number of documents address the role of the military in HADR operations.  
The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Strategic Plan for 
the DoS and USAID all outline the importance of HADR operations, both for enhancing 
the security of the United States and for improving the general welfare of people around 
the globe (Gates, 2008; Obama, 2010; USAID, 2007).  USAID specifically identifies two 
goals for HADR operations that are well-suited to the military: protection of civilians and 
alleviation of disaster effects.  USAID further recognizes the importance of partnership 
with the DoD for mounting logistical support for HADR operations (USAID, 2007).  
Despite the existence of high-level guidance declaring HADR a core mission for the 
military, the formation of doctrine is still in the early stages.  Relatively recently, the 
Navy released a Tactical Memorandum (TACMEMO) that goes a long way toward 
establishing hard doctrine for HADR operations, but it still specifically acknowledges the 
likely existence of tension between an on-scene commander and higher headquarters and 
of a deficit of training for the mission, both due to the irregularity with which the Navy 
executes HADR operations (DoN, 2005a). 
The Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) defines the guidelines for 
the DoD’s Humanitarian Assistance Program and Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Response programs (DSCA, 2003).  This document covers funding methods, guiding 
legislation, basic processes, and the request process that is followed to obtain assistance 
from the United States, as indicated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. The Executive Secretariat Process 
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The SAMM “provides guidance for the administration and implementation of 
Security Assistance and related activities in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA)” (DSCA, 2009, p. 2).  The SAMM is a governing document for the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the JCS, CCDRs, and all DoD components engaged in 
HADR operations (DSCA, 2003).  The JCS have provided a publication that reiterates 
the path of assistance request but also provides more detail regarding the direct 
management of the DoD’s response to a request for aid.  Figure 12 documents the 
interaction of various entities in the decision and management chain. 
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2. Capabilities and Conflicts 
Pettit and Beresford (2005) drew on earlier work (Leaning, Chen, & Briggs, 
1999) to create a thorough understanding of the broad capabilities the military offers to 
the conduct of HADR operations.  Though there are numerous capabilities the military 
brings to the table for conducting HADR operations, there is a limitation.  Historically, 
the military is not intended for conducting disaster relief efforts, and both Pettit and 
Beresford (2005) and Leaning et al. (1999) argue that this creates numerous conflicts 
between military actors and the roles they fill in relief efforts.  A number of other authors 
in the field have outlined similar sets of capabilities and conflicts that the military adds to 
the field of HADR (Byman, Lesser, Pirnie, Bernard, & Wazman, 2000).  Figure 13 and 
Figure 14 are summaries of both capabilities and conflicts that are due to the military’s 
involvement in HADR efforts. The figures were originally compiled by Leaning et al. 
(1999) and later adapted by Pettit and Beresford (2005). 
 
Figure 13. Military Operational Capabilities 








Figure 14. Conflict Between the Military and Its Role in HADR Operations 
(Pettit & Beresford, 2005) 
 
3. Force Response Methods 
There are two principal ways that forces are assigned to HADR operations.  If a 
Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) exists for an operation, assets may be 
assigned to the TPFDL and allocated for the operation before the operation begins.  The 
TPFDL exists in the database portion of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution 
System (JOPES) and provides CCDRs with oversight of asset movements and 
assignments (Preston, 2010).  The other method is through a Request for Forces (RFF).  
The RFF process is more dynamic than the use of TPFDL and allows CCDRs to request 
specific asset capabilities directly from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).  If approved, 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) will source the required assets and alert each asset in a 
deployment order.  With RFF, unlike using TPFDL, there is no single document that 
details an exact breakdown of the assets assigned to be used in support of an operation 
(Preston, 2010).  Essentially, the TPFDL method involves a concrete understanding of 
exactly what assets will be used to support an operation, while the RFF method provides 
CCDRs with an à la carte selection of assets upon request. 
Many combat operations are thought through in more detail than HADR 
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operations follow Operational Plans (OPLANs) that are very detailed and include TPFDL 
as part of their guidelines.  HADR operations are typically viewed as operations 
impossible to prepare for in such detail and thus are based on Concept Plans 
(CONPLANs) or Functional Plans (FUNCPLANs), which are less developed and 
detailed (Commander, USCENTCOM, 2007; Commander, USEUCOM, 2001; 
Commander, USNORTHCOM, 2007; Commander, USPACOM, 2003; Commander, 
USSOUTHCOM, 2006).  Neither CONPLANs nor FUNCPLANs include TPFDL 
(Preston, 2010). 
4. The Navy’s Role 
The USN has set HADR as one of its core capabilities (DoN, 2007), ensuring that 
it is active in both proactive and reactive HADR operations.  The USN stays engaged in a 
proactive manner by conducting missions like Pacific Partnership, deploying the USNS 
Mercy hospital ship to remote areas throughout the South Pacific, and bringing medical 
aid and supplies while providing free medical procedures for the local populations.  The 
proactive HADR operations are critical in maintaining political and popular support for 
these countries.  While proactive HADR operations are important, they are not our focus 
in this project.  In this project, we take an analytical approach to the reactive HADR 
operations.  Reactive HADR operations refer to the response to disasters as they occur.  
As part of reactive HADR operations, the USN sends vessels that are in the geographical 
area and can provide some form of support to the affected region.   
From the DoD perspective, the Combatant Command (COCOM) is in charge of 
directing asset response for HADR operations (Brannman & May, 2009).  Once assets 
are assigned, they are managed primarily at the Joint Task Force (JTF) level (JCS, 2009).  
One document in particular defines the Navy’s role in HADR operations.  TACMEMO 3-
07.6-05 is used to “guide a commander and staff in the thought process, planning, and 
course of action development needed to prepare for and conduct foreign disaster relief 
operations” (DoN, 2005a, p. 1-1).  This memorandum covers a variety of topics, 
including training, information sharing, command and control, and logistics.  Logistics is 
the largest chapter in the memo, providing some insight into the role the Navy envisions 
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Navy is evident in the text.  The chapter carefully defines how to employ MSC assets, 
focusing on the use of prepositioning stock, sea basing, and water purification capability.  
All other surface assets are lumped together.  Smaller assets are completely disregarded 
in favor of discussion of employment tactics for large deck vessels, landing craft, and 
HSVs, which provide great opportunity for sea basing, evacuation and casualty 
collection, and quick transportation of supplies (DoN, 2005a). 
Additional attention is given to the time line in which the Navy will typically 
conduct HADR operations.  Due to the high potential for rapid loss of life immediately 
following a disaster, the memo gives blanket authority to begin conducting HADR 
operations even before receiving full approval from higher headquarters (DoN, 2005a).  
The logistics chapter of the memo also requires early relief efforts be structured to 
simplify the process of transferring responsibility to NGOs, or the host nation, at the 
earliest possible point.  The Navy’s focus on logistics and speed in disaster response 
matches the model first put forward by Haas et al. (1977) and later adapted by Pettit and 
Beresford (2005), which depicted rapidly increasing military involvement in HADR 
operations upon the occurrence of a disaster, then decreasing participation in operations 
as time progresses. 
5.  U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command Resources 
The USN’s MSC has a multitude of assets and platforms that it can choose from 
to conduct HADR operations.  The capabilities and limitations of these vessels are 
highlighted in a general overview publication called Jane’s Fighting Ships (Jane’s, 2010), 
more commonly known as Jane’s.  Jane’s is an annual publication that acts as an index 
and reference tool to see what every nation has as a military asset.  Jane’s is part of a 
series of publications that encompass every piece of hardware that a country’s military 
may have, even including a multitude of civilian assets such as commercial aircraft and 
communication systems.   
The project concentrates on the Jane’s publication to get general information that 
will help to shape the matrix development.  Specific information provided in the 
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seamanship term describing the depth in the water to which a vessel extends).  These 
specifications will be crucial in determining which assets can respond to certain disasters.  
As mentioned previously, in Bangladesh, a DDG was sent to respond to a disaster off its 
coast but was unable to assist due to draft constraints.  In addition to physical properties 
of a vessel, Jane’s provides insight into berthing size, crew size, fresh water generating 
capacity, and so forth.  All these characteristics will help in the construction and 
development of the matrix.   
Another source for USN and MSC platform characteristics is the U.S. Navy 
website, which also includes a significant description of the capabilities and limitations of 
specific vessels.  The two sources were contrasted and compared to each other to ensure 
that accurate data is procured for the matrix. 
D. THE CONTEXT OF OUR RESEARCH IN HADR 
1. The Gap in Navy-Related HADR Research 
There are a number of publications (including JCS, 2009, and DoN, 2005a) that 
delineate the actions Navy commanders should take when conducting HADR operations.  
Similarly, there is a significant amount of literature covering academic analysis of 
different logistical aspects of HADR operations, but there is little that analyzes where 
exactly the Navy best fits into the picture, how efficiently the Navy performs HADR 
operations, or which Navy assets should be used for which missions.  The Combatant 
Command Support Program (CCSP) published a report edited by Lidy and Kunder that 
provided the only direct reference to asset usefulness in HADR operations; however, 
even this report was vague, specifying only “air transport” as the DoD asset most needed 
during responses to Hurricane Georges and Hurricane Mitch (CCSP, 2005). 
The CCSP report further offers a long list of questions that may be applied to 
evaluate HADR operations.  The questions that might apply to the asset assignment 
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Table 1. Asset Assignment Evaluation Questions 
(CCSP, 2005)3 
Question 1 Are DoD asset assignments directed by discernible, quantifiable Measures 
of Effectiveness (MOE)? 
Question 2 Was the DoD’s asset assignment effective, based on the needs of the 
disaster victims (and considering political and theater pressures on 
mission assignments)? 
Question 3 Were assets assigned in accordance with DoD doctrine or standard 
procedures?  (Does a standard procedure exist?) 
Question 4 Was the DoD’s choice cost-effective, both in terms of accomplishing the 
mission at the lowest financial cost and in terms of deploying the assets 
best suited for the mission? 
 
Not only does the CCSP report offer questions that can be asked to guide the 
evaluation of the HADR operations, but it also offers reform suggestions for JTFs that 
will improve HADR efficiency (CCSP, 2005).  These reforms include a predetermined 
asset composition of HADR JTFs and predetermined task unit assignments for HADR 
(CCSP, 2005). 
Prior to the release of the CCSP report in 2005, Thomas (2003) also stated that 
standardization of efficiency measures is necessary for improving HADR operational 
efficiency.  Thomas recognized that a focus on “knowledge management…metrics, 
performance measurement and learning” (2003, p. 8) will increase the effectiveness of 
HADR operations.  The key to Thomas’s management of knowledge improvement is the 
ability to pass along decision-making processes during job turnovers, so that so-called 
corporate knowledge does not run the decision-making process.  She submits that actual 
past performance in similar situations (in this case, similar relief operations) may be used 
to evaluate future performance when establishing metrics for performance measurement. 
Beamon and Balcik (2008) also discussed the performance measurement of 
HADR operations, although they focus on the supply chain similarities.  Beamon and 
Balcik provide a synthesis of various works in the field to create a composite framework 
for evaluating the effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility of HADR operational supply 
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chains and operational execution processes.  Beamon and Balcik also provide a 
framework for creating a performance measurement system to be applied to the 
humanitarian relief sector, shown in Table 2, which can contribute to the development of 
our process for evaluating the Navy’s HADR operations. 
Table 2. Relief Chain Performance Metrics 
(Beamon & Balcik, 2008) 
 
Our research does not propose specific measures of efficiency or effectiveness.  
We provide a picture of the “standard” utility provided by the USN and MSC in a HADR 
operation, which provides a foundation for future research into appropriate measures of 
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Brannman and May (2009) documented the ad hoc nature of HADR operations 
that results from lack of standardization in the planning and execution process.  
Brannman and May suggested that standardization of planning and execution would 
improve efficiency dramatically.  Preston (2010) agreed that some standardization is 
needed but points out that use of the TPFDL method can result in inflexibility of response 
because changing TPFDL assignments is a very bureaucratic process.  Conversely, the 
RFF process provides the CCDR with more flexibility—in fact, possibly too much 
flexibility, since “by not having a rigid schedule or list of units, the wrong units may be 
deployed at the wrong time” (Preston, 2010, p. 9). 
Preston argued in favor of creating a hybrid method of force assignment for 
HADR operations or merging the TPFDL and RFF methods.  He theorized that the 
initiation of a HADR operation requires CCDRs to operate with flexibility but also with 
guidelines.  Such an initial response might be patterned after the RFF process but provide 
CCDRs with a list of assets they should consider as top priority at the beginning of the 
response effort.  Following the initial response, there should be a more concrete 
understanding of capability needs and, therefore, more defined asset requirements, 
following the TPFDL method.  Late in the military’s response process, Preston (2010) 
argued that more flexibility would again be required, because asset capability needs will 
change depending on disaster type, location, and the availability of assets meeting unique 
capability requirements earlier in the response. 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (JCS, 2009) and NWDC TACMEMO 3-07.6-05 
(DoN, 2005a) both enumerate capabilities that will likely be needed in HADR operations.  
They each pay a small amount of attention to defining which capabilities will be needed 
in which order, and they make little or no effort to define what assets meet specific 
capabilities.  Preston (2010) argued for the creation of what he called an “Initial 
Deployment Framework,” which lays out the capabilities needed, the services and 
specific assets by Unit Identification Code (UIC) to meet each capability, the Unit Type 
Code (UTC), and how long after the disaster the capability will be needed, by 
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Table 3. Initial Deployment Framework Example 
(Preston, 2010) 
Capability Service UIC UTC CRD 
Forward Deployed 
JTF C2 element 























While such a plan helps to standardize the response process, Preston (2010) 
acknowledged that an initial deployment framework with the form he has proposed has 
limited usefulness if it is not based on lessons learned from past operations, current 
doctrine, and the specific capabilities of assets. 
The main purpose of this project is to gain more insight in analysis of which USN 
and MSC assets are best matched to specific disasters.  A firm understanding of this link 
will help the USN make effective and efficient decisions in planning and executing 
HADR operations throughout the world, and if needed, help determine appropriate 
assignment criteria for assets used to support the HADR mission.  We have used the 
suggestions of Thomas (2003) and the CCSP report (2005) as guidelines for developing a 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
We collected data from various naval specification publications, disaster research, 
and historical documents and compiled them into separate tables on various fields.  We 
analyzed these tables for patterns and specific characteristics so we can characterize a 
typical USN and MSC involvement in HADR response and determine where the military 
can focus its efforts to improve.  In the analysis, we provide conclusions and 
recommendations about which HADR operations can be more efficient in the future.  In 
the conclusion, we also identify limitations in the research, benefits of the research, and 
recommendations for more in-depth research, which could be a continuation of this 
project.  
A. DATA COLLECTION 
We tabulated the data collection into three primary groups of tables.  The tables 
are broken down into disaster characteristics, time lines of actual USN HADR responses 
to specified disasters, and USN/MSC platform capabilities to conduct HADR missions.  
Tabulation of data assists in the assessment of historical responses, development of 
general disaster recovery mission requirements, and capabilities of USN and MSC 
platforms to assist in disaster recovery efforts.  The end result allows the researchers to 
identify patterns and determine effectiveness of USN response to disasters.  Figure 15 






























Figure 15. Project Flow Diagram 
1. Disaster Traits 
Understanding disaster characteristics is important to comprehend future 
requirements that the USN may be requested to conduct in response to disasters.  
Determining which basic missions are associated with specific disasters will help in 
determining which assets are best suited for future HADR operations.  Because the U.S. 
Navy typically plays a larger role in responding to disasters that occur along shorelines, 
we examined three types of natural disasters that will frequently elicit Navy responses.  
Hurricanes and tsunamis both inherently involve the ocean, and because earthquakes are 
a frequent cause of tsunamis, we examine these three types of disaster responses (NGDC, 
2011a; NGDC, 2011b).  Because this is an analysis of USN HADR response, the only 
earthquakes that we analyzed were those to which the USN would have the capability to 
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When researching disaster characteristics, it was important to ensure that the 
information compiled was quantitative and comparable to other disasters.  No disaster is 
exactly the same as any other, and therefore, each poses difficulties in comparing and 
contrasting.  In order to allow for comparison analyses, the data collection focused on 
specific quantitative information, including number of deaths, number of injuries, and 
economic impact (in U.S. dollars) of the disaster.  As discussed in the Literature Review, 
one of our goals was to develop a list of common traits among disasters.  Research into 
specific historical examples of disasters the USN has responded to provide the basis for 
this analysis. 
The EM-DAT database provides historical data on hurricanes (also referred to as 
cyclones), earthquakes, and accompanying tsunamis (EM-DAT, 2009).  Other sources of 
information were obtained from FEMA (www.fema.gov) and the NOAA’s National 
Weather Service (www.noaa.gov) websites. 
2. U.S. Navy HADR Responses 
The second phase of data collection was the actual responses that the USN has 
conducted to specified disasters.  For simplicity, we looked at specific historical disasters 
that occurred within the past decade and that best represent assets in the USN response.  
In the project, we did not look for the reason that a certain asset was sent; rather, we 
strictly input the raw data of the assets that were sent.  The USN HADR data collection 
answers which assets, specifically, the USN and MSC sent to respond to a specific 
disaster.  We researched one disaster from each type (as specified in Table 4): hurricanes, 
tsunamis, and earthquakes. 
Table 4. Disasters for HADR Response Analysis 
Hurricane Tsunami Earthquake 
Hurricane Katrina, 2005 Indian Ocean, 2004 Haiti, 2010 
The disasters in Table 4 were decided upon based on the diversity of their 
classification in addition to their timing and high visibility.  The tsunami was a dispersed 
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moderate speed but was a domestic and localized disaster; whereas the Haiti earthquake 
was a sudden, localized, and international response.  Moreover, the USN had a large role 
in each of these disasters, which makes it a good source for data collection.   
Data collection for the USN response to the specified disasters was conducted 
through operational commander historical logs and archives where possible, other official 
government records as secondary sources, and civilian records as tertiary options.  
CCDRs and Functional Commanders maintain historical archives.  A majority of data 
came from operational chronological records, Operational Orders (OPORD), Deployment 
Orders (DEPORD), and daily situational reports (SITREP).  The goal of the archive 
investigation was to recreate the disaster response, focusing solely on the presence of 
USN and MSC assets in the relief efforts.  The empirical data that we used to augment 
the tables includes asset type, time of arrival, duration of HADR mission, and missions 
performed during the HADR operations. 
The data we collected in this phase of the project was critical for analyzing how 
the USN has responded in the past.  By understanding which assets were sent in response 
to disaster, we were able to make recommendations as to which assets need to be sent in 
future HADR operations.  We compare the USN’s actual response to the concluded 
recommendations and provide insight into the savings and efficiency gains to the USN, if 
the recommendations were implemented.  
3. USN and MSC Platform Characteristics 
The final portion of data collection was concerned with characteristics of USN 
and MSC platforms. Studying the characteristics helped in determining which assets are 
best suited for HADR missions.  We used the data to augment the USN and MSC 
capability chart.  The chart looks at specified details that can be applied across all USN 
and MSC vessels.  When collecting data, we looked at characteristics such as vessel 
speed, draft, lift capacity, onboard personnel, fresh water making capacity, storage space, 
and so forth.  The compilation of data was essential in determining mission capability 
parameters for HADR missions to determine mission capability categorization for various 
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Jane’s Fighting Ships (Jane’s, 2010), the online Navy Fact Files 
(www.navy.mil/navydata/fact.asp), and the MSC Handbook (MSC, 2010). 
B. TABLE CONSTRUCTION 
We tabulated data in a three-phrase process as data was collected.  We generated 
the table topics before data collection took place to act as a guideline for research.  We 
constructed a variety of tables and appendices containing data on disaster traits, standard 
mission requests, ship and aircraft characteristics, ship mission capabilities, and USN 
responses to specified disasters. 
1. Disaster Traits 
 After we categorize the disasters, we included this information in the tables to 
display a variety of characteristics that were common among the disasters.  These 
characteristics serve as a short summary of the effects of the disaster.  Characteristics 
include number of deaths, number of injuries, homelessness, economic damage, and so 
forth.   
The idea behind the disaster table was to determine common protocols that a local 
government and embassy may need in the event of a disaster.  These common protocols 
are matched with USN asset capability to determine which assets are best suited to 
conduct desired missions. 
2. USN HADR Responses 
The second table consists of data collected from actual USN HADR responses.  
As indicated previously, the project delineated specific disasters to which the USN has 
responded.  The purpose in compiling that information in a central table was to create a 
guide to demonstrate how the USN currently responds to disasters.  The table lists each 
disaster, as indicated in Table 4, and inventories all USN and MSC assets that responded 
to the associated disaster.  The specific platform was researched to determine when the 
asset arrived, the length of the activation process, how long each vessel was on station, 
what capabilities they brought to the area, and other amplifying information that may be 
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3. USN and MSC Platform Capabilities 
The final table is a collection of data regarding the capabilities of every USN and 
MSC vessel.  The goal was to determine which asset is best suited for conducting HADR 
operations.  Due to operational constraints, it is impossible for the optimal ship to always 
respond, and therefore, the table indicates a pecking order for ships to respond as they 
become available.  Studying the platform capability table will help commanders 
determine which vessels will be assigned to different missions.  Specific data that is 
amalgamated into the table includes ship size characteristics, lift capacity, onboard 
personnel, onboard medical supplies, fresh water-making capability, and other 
characteristics related to the identified HADR missions.  
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
 After we completed the construction of the tables, we conducted a detailed 
analysis of the compiled data.  Our goal in performing that analysis was to find patterns 
in disaster traits and determine if there is much commonality between these various 
disasters.  We expected that every disaster, although unique, possesses certain traits such 
as deaths, injuries, homelessness, and damaged infrastructure.  Because the USN 
responds to mission requirements, we attempted in this project to develop a list of 
standard requirements for all disaster responses.  By accepting as one of the parameters 
of this project that all major disasters have these properties, we will provide the basis for 
why it is important to classify USN and MSC platforms to respond to said requirements.  
As defined by FEMA, a disaster is set by the parameters that it caused either loss of 
human life or an economic loss of $1 million or more.   
 Beyond standard disaster missions, the goal of our project was to determine which 
USN and MSC assets are best matched to conduct these mission requirements.  As stated 
previously, it is impossible to rely on the best assets to always be available; therefore, the 
project was designed to list ships in order of their effectiveness.  In the event of a 
disaster, Fleet Commanders can use this guidance to determine which available ships will 
be optimal to respond to the affected area.  Beyond determining which assets are best to 
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platforms offer little to zero assistance capability.  Historically, the USN has sent assets 
that were in close proximity to a disaster but served no function once they arrived.  The 
project reveals which assets will produce little to no assistance and, therefore, be a waste 
of resources to send.  Knowing which assets should not be sent to assist in HADR 
operations can be just as beneficial to the USN as knowing which assets should be sent.  
 With mission capabilities applied to the various USN and MSC platforms, the 
project can be used as a tool in determining the overall effectiveness of historical HADR 
operations.  By doing a comparison of what did happen versus what should have 
happened, we provide information to prove the effectiveness of HADR operations. 
D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The final process of this project was to define conclusions and summarize the 
project’s main points.  We drew the conclusions from our analysis, and they paint a clear 
picture as to the necessity of using the project in planning for future HADR operations.  
Ideally, the project will lead to changes in operational readiness.  Currently, there is no 
standby ship designated for HADR operations.  If this project proves to be substantial and 
beneficial then, ideally, these operational changes will be implemented in the future.   
In addition to changing operational readiness, this project may be taken into 
consideration when it comes to fleet composition.  Currently, there is no platform that is 
specifically designed to assist in disaster relief operations.  If, in the future, the USN 
wants to take a more in-depth role in HADR operations, they may consider designing a 
platform around the mission.  This project could be used as a guide to the requirements 
that the vessel would have to conduct in order to be an effective HADR vessel.   
Our ultimate goal for this project was to bring to light several of the shortcomings 
that the USN has in its HADR operations and to characterize the standard “shape” of 
USN and MSC assistance in HADR efforts.  By bringing to light these shortcomings, we 
hope to create more interest and, in turn, more concern and policy implementations that 
will make HADR operations more effective.  By making the USN HADR operations 
more effective, the military can expect that more lives will be saved and devastated areas 
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Following the conclusion, we end the project with further research ideas.  The 
research ideas are related to gaps this project could not fill.  The research gaps identify 
other areas of interest that will improve USN HADR operations.  The goal is to have the 
interest in this research field continue for generations to come.  The more research 
conducted in the HADR community, the more effective the process will become and the 
more lives will be saved.  
E. SCOPE 
1. Benefits 
The results of this project can provide great benefits to the DoD.  The project will 
potentially generate easy to understand matrices that will encompass historical data from 
past HADR operations and determine the value of USN and MSC assets to various 
disaster situations.  The results will be beneficial to CCDRs who must decide the 
appropriate response to disasters as disasters occur in the AOR. 
In the short term, the historical database will allow planners to see how 
operational decisions regarding HADR operations in the past have affected and 
influenced the relief and aid of affected areas.  It will also provide the DoD with an 
understanding of whether or not a response was thought out and well planned or ad hoc.  
The lessons learned will be imperative to improving the future decisions that planners, 
CCDRs, and the DoD will have to make as disasters occur.  The ship characteristic table 
will provide a guided reference for CCDRs to decide which assets they can, and should, 
use for HADR operations.  The application of the matrix conclusions will allow decision-
makers to conduct HADR operations that are more effective and cost-efficient.   
In the long term, this project could affect fleet force structure.  As the U.S. 
evolves in the 21st century, military operations will change, leading to a change in fleet 
force structure.  As the U.S. moves to improve its foreign relations through the use of soft 
power, the USN will need to consider updating its assets.  To meet the demands of future 
HADR operations, the USN may decide to provide dedicated assets on standby to assist 
when disasters occur.  The matrices will provide insight as to which assets will be most 
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that are designed around the HADR mission.  In the future, the USN and MSC may wish 
to develop such a platform, and the results of this project can help to identify which 
characteristics and options a ship must have to successfully conduct the HADR mission. 
2. Limitations 
The limitations of this project lie in the subjective weighting factors that were 
applied to the matrices.  The subjective factors, which were applied to various 
characteristics of different platforms, leave room for discrepancies.  It is difficult to 
quantify how a certain characteristic, such as a specific crew size, provides more helpful 
features than another characteristic.  Through the use of rigorous research, we 
implemented a weighting factor that best fits trends in the data and is as quantitative as 
possible while including as little qualitative assessment as possible; however, there is still 
ambiguity in the determinations. 
Applicability could be another limitation of the project.  The study was of USN 
and MSC assets.  The uniqueness of USN and MSC assets is that they are limited to the 
waters in which they can navigate.  While USN and MSC ships can only respond from a 
body of water, the primary place in which a disaster can impose damage to property and 
life is on land.  A USN or MSC vessel can only assist those who are affected within a 
certain radius of a coastline.  Because of this restriction, in the project, we analyze only 
disasters that fall into these restrictions and therefore exclude the humanitarian relief data 
from any other disaster.  The restrictions on the research may skew the whole picture of 
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IV. EMPIRICAL DATA 
A. DISASTER CHARACTERISTICS 
This chapter defines common traits among disasters to which the USN and MSC 
have provided significant HADR support.  Determining common disaster traits allows 
prediction of the missions the USN and MSC will face in support of HADR operations.  
A list of possible military missions allows prediction of which assets are best suited for 
deployment in support of HADR operations.  Developing a list of common traits of 
disasters that elicit a USN and MSC response is important because it influences USN 
expectations, preparedness, and preparation for future HADR operations.   
1. Disasters 
In order to understand the missions requested of the USN and MSC in a disaster 
response, we must first understand some common characteristics of disasters.  Each 
disaster contains some unique characteristics; however, there are standard characteristics 
among all disasters that might involve a USN response, which can be used to guide 
preparation and response structures.  This section is an overview of the 2004 tsunami in 
the Indian Ocean, Hurricane Katrina, and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.  Each of these 
disasters prompted significant USN and MSC response.  From the disaster overviews, we 
compiled a list of standard characteristics expected of disasters to which the USN and 
MSC will respond in the future (Pettit & Beresford, 2005). 
a. Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2004 
The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 was the result of an earthquake that 
measured magnitude 9.1 on the Richter scale—the fourth-largest earthquake worldwide 
since 1900 (Pickrell, 2005).  Indonesia received most of the damage, with total 
destruction of many elements of infrastructure.  The coastal highway on the island of 
Sumatra was completely destroyed, making many damaged areas completely inaccessible 
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more than a dozen countries, ranging from Somalia in the west to Sri Lanka and India in 
the north to Indonesia in the southeast (Pickrell, 2005), as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Effects of Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2004 
(National Geographic, 2005; NGDC, 2011b; VanRooyen & Leaning, 2005) 
Deaths > 227,000 
Injured > 500,000 
Missing > 2,000,000 (summary of initial reports) 
Displaced > 1,500,000 
In Indonesia, more than 25% of Aceh Province’s villages were destroyed. 
Land transportation infrastructure was almost totally destroyed on many islands 
throughout the Indian Ocean. 
Indonesia’s Aceh Province lost almost all elements of local communications 
infrastructure. 
Many islands lost all electric-power production capability. 
The U.S. pledged more than one third of a billion dollars to repair and replace roads and 
fresh water distribution systems alone. 
 
b. Hurricane Katrina, 2005 
Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana’s coastline on August 29, 2005.  At 
landfall, the storm was a Category 3 on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale, with winds 
greater than 125 mph (NOAA Public Affairs, 2007).  Hurricane Katrina is recognized as 
the most costly hurricane ever to strike the United States, with an estimated $135 billion 
in damage to the Gulf Coast states (Plyer, 2010).  The summarized resulting effects of the 
earthquake are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Effects of Hurricane Katrina, 2005 
(CRS, 2005; Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, 2006; NOAA Public Affairs, 
2007; Plyer, 2010) 
Deaths >1,700 
Injured >2,000 in New Orleans alone 
Missing >12,000 reported, 135 still missing in August 2006 
Displaced >1,000,000 in gulf coast states 
>Three million people without power; broken water mains left thousands without fresh 
water 
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>80% of New Orleans underwater on August 31, 2005 
Major flooding and closure of many gulf coast highways 
Considerable damage to the oil and fishing industries 
c. Haiti Earthquake, 2010 
We noted in our introduction that the earthquake that impacted Haiti on 
January 12, 2010, was horrendous and significant.  For 35 seconds, the 7.0-magnitude 
earthquake rocked the small island and caused significant damage to the population and 
infrastructure (Aymat, 2010).  Table 7 provides a summary of the effects of the 
earthquake. 
Table 7. Effects of Haiti Earthquake, 2010 
(Wooldridge, 2010) 




Destruction of all five medical facilities around Port-au-Prince 
Destruction of Toussaint L’Ouverture International Airport 
Major damages to the Port-au-Prince seaport, rendering it unusable for immediate rescue 
operations 
Major damage to roadways by debris and destruction 
Considerable damage to communication infrastructure 
 
In addition to the commercial infrastructure damage, the mayor of Léogâne 
estimated that 90% of all buildings in Port-au-Prince were destroyed or deemed unusable 
as a result of the earthquake (Allen, 2010). 
B. DERIVING STANDARD TRAITS FROM SPECIFIED DISASTERS 
While each disaster presents a unique and complex situation, there are basic 
similarities between most disasters.  In this project, we examined three disasters 
significant enough to warrant a HADR response from the DoD: the 2004 Indian Ocean 
earthquake/tsunami and its effect (primarily) on Indonesia, Hurricane Katrina, and the 
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injuries, large population dispersion, and widespread destruction of infrastructure, 
including transportation means and facilities.  Though diverse in classification (Apte, 
2009), we found these disasters to have several common traits that are present in every 
significant disaster (EM-DAT, 2011).  Of the many common traits between disasters, we 
limited our analysis to traits the USN and MSC can directly influence and considered 
only those outlined in Table 8. 
Table 8. Basic Disaster Traits 
Basic Disaster Traits 
High number of deaths and injuries 
Population dispersion, homelessness, and high number of missing persons 
Facility destruction and loss of common goods such as fresh water supply 
Increased demand for fresh water, food, and medical supplies 
Need for medical personnel, facilities, and volunteers 
Destruction of transportation infrastructures such as airports, seaports, 
railroads, and roads 
High amounts of debris and destroyed buildings 
Uncertainty in coastline with regards to navigation (coastal specific) 
 
We acknowledge that all these traits may not be present in every disaster, but due 
to their coastal locations, and therefore generally higher populations and lower 
elevations, the disasters to which the USN and MSC respond will exhibit most of these 
traits.  This list of specific traits helped to develop basic mission requests tasked to the 
USN and MSC in HADR operations. 
C. LINKING DISASTER TRAITS TO MILITARY MISSIONS 
The USN and MSC have a plethora of vessels with multimission capability.  In 
order to understand which ships are better suited for HADR operations, we must first 
explore the different types of missions that commanders will be requested to conduct.  In 
Chapter II, we defined the HADR request process.  This process is key to understanding 
mission tasking for USN and MSC assets. 
The recovery effort, postdisaster strike, is the responsibility of the affected 
nation’s embassy if the disaster is overseas, or the state’s governor, in the case of 
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requests assistance from the DoS and DoD.  In the DoD, once the regional CCDR 
receives capability requests from the DoS and the host nation embassy, the requested 
capabilities are converted to military missions and the Component Commanders are 
informed.  Mission requests and ship capabilities merge once the request goes to the 
Component Commander.  The Component Commander sends the request to the Fleet 
Commander.  It is the responsibility of the Fleet Commander to link a mission request to 
a specific asset (ship class) and recommend specific assets for the response.  The process 
emphasizes the importance of determining missions, linking missions to capabilities, and 
recommending assets for the response effort.  By linking disaster traits to mission 
requests, the USN can determine which ships can conduct which missions. 
To determine likely mission requests, we examined what the USN can do to help 
alleviate some of the burdens caused by disasters.  Using common disaster traits derived 
in the previous section, we determined the mission, capability, and role a USN ship will 
play if assigned to a HADR operation.  For example, we identified population dispersion, 
homelessness, and a high number of missing persons as a common trait in significant 
disasters.  The USN can assist with finding missing persons by conducting search and 
rescue (SAR) missions.  In addition to SAR missions, the USN can help the high number 
of homeless by conducting personnel transfers from unstable locations to stable locations.  
The best way a USN vessel can conduct SAR operations is to use an embarked helicopter 
with night vision capability and a communication suite.  Personnel transfers are best done 
with a vessel designed to hold lots of personnel, capable of traveling at high speeds, and 
with a shallow draft.  These are examples of how the military must convert disaster traits 
into capability requests.  The linking of disaster traits and capability requests will help us 
to develop a list of standard missions that will be requested in HADR operations. 
D. BASIC HADR MISSION REQUESTS 
To create a basis for determining common mission requests, we connected 
common disaster traits with USN and MSC capabilities.  There is a lot of overlap in 
capability requests between missions.  For example, the capability to support lift 
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movement of cargo, food, and water.  Table 9 provides a list of the most common 
mission requests the USN and MSC will receive.  



















































We broke the missions down into two categories: critical missions and non-
critical missions.  Critical missions are those that have a high impact on relief efforts, 
while non-critical missions do not commonly have a major impact on affected personnel 
or land-based facilities.  Based on the common characteristics of disasters the USN and 
MSC respond to, the missions presented in Table 9 illustrate a core set of HADR 
missions for the USN and MSC in any response effort.   
USN and MSC vessels are capable of performing several missions independently 
or concurrently.  We have used a list of common disaster characteristics to identify 
common capability requests and missions that the USN and MSC may be tasked to 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 47 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
HADR mission requests to help determine which vessels are best suited to various 
aspects of HADR operations and which vessels have little to no capability to conduct 
HADR missions. 
E. USN AND MSC ASSETS 
1. U.S. Navy Vessels 
Once a base of HADR mission requests and ship characteristics are identified, it 
then becomes necessary to match these characteristics to actual USN and MSC platforms.  
In order to fulfill all identified HADR missions, the USN must use a mix of multiple 
platforms.  To determine which vessels are best suited from HADR missions, we must 
first understand the basic characteristics of USN and MSC vessels.  Appendix A contains 
a breakdown of USN ship characteristics. 
We could find no evidence of submarines actually contributing to any HADR 
operations, although two were present during Unified Assistance, the 2004 response to 
the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (Lefebvre, 2005).  Unified Assistance 
was unique in response structure because both a CSG and an ESG responded, each with 
an attached submarine (Elleman, 2007).  As a result, we have excluded them from our 
analysis of capabilities. 
The important takeaways from Appendix A are the characteristics that are 
relevant to HADR operations.  We mentioned that HADR operations require a significant 
lift capability, which for a naval vessel means the ability to support the aircraft and 
landing craft that will be conducting lifts.  Each ship and their HADR-related 
characteristics are broken down by platform, to include the various classes within the 
platform.  The characteristics in this appendix are not all inclusive; they only portray the 
characteristics applicable to HADR operations. 
2. MSC Vessels 
Ownership plays a unique role in the way in which MSC vessels can be tasked 
and are on hand at any given time.  As opposed to the USN, not all of MSC’s vessels are 
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MSC Handbook (MSC, 2010) provide an explanation of how MSC vessels are broken 
down: 
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Forces—PM1 
The ships of MSC’s Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) are the supply 
lines to USN ships at sea.  These ships provide virtually everything that 
navy ships need, including fuel, food, ordnance, spare parts, mail and 
other supplies.  NFAF ships enable the navy fleet to remain at sea, on 
station and combat ready for extended periods of time.  NFAF ships also 
conduct towing, rescue and salvage operations and provide floating 
medical facilities. 
All NFAF ships are Government-owned and Government-operated.  The 
crews consist of civil service mariners.  Some of the ships also have a 
small contingent of navy personnel aboard for operations support, supply 
coordination and helicopter operations. (MSC, 2010, p. 10) 
Special Mission—PM2 
The Special Mission Program has 26 ships that provide operating 
platforms and services for a wide variety of U.S. military and other U.S. 
Government missions.  Most special mission ships are Government-owned 
and operated by civilian mariners who work for private companies under 
contract to MSC.  Three ships have hybrid crews that combine uniformed 
Navy personnel with civil service mariners under the leadership of a U.S. 
Navy captain.  One vessel, USNS Zeus, is Government-owned and crewed 
by MSC civil service mariners.  Additionally, other PM2 ships are 
contracted to MSC and are crewed by U.S. civilian mariners who work for 
ship operating companies under contract to the government. (MSC, 2010, 
p. 11) 
Prepositioning—PM3 
MSC’s Prepositioning Program is an essential element in the U.S. 
military’s readiness strategy.  Afloat prepositioning strategically places 
military equipment and supplies onboard ships located in key ocean areas 
to ensure rapid availability during a major theater war, a humanitarian 
operation or other contingency. 
Most MSC’s prepositioning ships are able to discharge cargo pierside or 
while anchored offshore by using shallow-draft barges, called lighterage, 
that are carried aboard.  This allows cargo to be ferried to shore in areas 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 49 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Prepositioning ships include a combination of U.S. Government-owned 
ships, chartered U.S.-flagged ships and ships activated from the maritime 
Administration’s Ready Reserve Force.  All prepositioning ships are 
crewed by U.S. civilian mariners who work for ship operating companies 
under contract to the Government. (MSC, 2010, p. 12–13) 
Sealift—PM5 
MSC’s Sealift Program provides high-quality, efficient and cost-effective 
ocean transportation for DOD and other federal agencies during peacetime 
and war.  More than 90 percent of U.S. warfighters’ equipment and 
supplies travels by sea.  The program manages a mix of Government-
owned and long-term-chartered dry cargo ships and tankers, as well as 
additional short-term or voyage-chartered ships.  By law and policy, MSC 
must first look to the U.S.-flagged market to meet its sealift requirements.  
Government-owned ships are used only when suitable U.S.-flagged 
commercial ships and unavailable.   
Nearly all peacetime DOD cargo is carried by U.S.-flagged commercial 
ships. But during wartime or other contingencies, MSC has the flexibility 
to charter international ships to move cargo as needed.  MSC can expand 
beyond this commercial capability by activating ships from its 
Government-owned surge fleet, including Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) 
from the Maritime Administration (MARAD). (MSC, 2010, p. 14) 
For classification purposes, we have divided MSC ships according to their Program (PM) 
designation.  Appendix B is the MSC ship inventory and associated characteristics. 
The most beneficial aspects of the MSC fleet are the ability to carry large amounts 
of cargo to the disaster area and the ability to provide significant medical support.  
Beyond cargo capacity, we will look at the benefits of MSC ships being self-sustaining, 
meaning capable of on-loading and off-loading cargo without the assistance of outside 
equipment.  The characteristics listed in Appendix B are those which are pertinent to 
HADR operations. 
3. Landing Craft 
USN landing craft play a unique role in HADR operations.  Landing craft serve as 
the waterborne link of transportation from amphibious platforms to shore.  In HADR 
operations, they play the critical role of getting supplies, cargo, and personnel to and 
from the shoreline and supporting ships.  While USN landing craft were not designed for 
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lays out pertinent characteristics that different landing craft bring to the HADR mission.  
The most applicable capabilities are lift capacity, draft, speed, and range.  The 
information from Appendix C will be used to determine how landing craft can benefit the 
USN in its HADR operations. 
4. Seaborne Aircraft 
The final assets we analyzed for this project are seaborne aircraft.  Seaborne 
aircraft include all helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that can be utilized by USN and 
MSC ships.  For the purpose of this project, we did not analyze any fixed-wing aircraft, 
with the exception of the MV-22 Osprey.  The fixed-wing aircraft were eliminated from 
this project because of their lack of ability to assist in HADR operations.  Military fixed-
wing aircraft that play any significant role in HADR operations are characteristically too 
large to land onboard any USN or MSC vessel and, therefore, play no role in determining 
the usefulness of different vessels to HADR operations. Table 10 contains a list of all 
USN seaborne aircraft that can be used in conducting HADR operations. 









SH‐60B Seahawk 145 10,000    450
SH‐60F Seahawk 145 10,000    600
MH‐60R Seahawk 145 10,000    450
MH‐60S Seahawk 154 10,000    420
HH‐60H  Seahawk 147 10,000    500
CH‐46E Sea Knight 137 8,500      180
CH‐53D Sea Stallion 130 10,000    578
CH‐53E Super Stallion 150 10,000    580
MH‐53E Sea Dragon 150 10,000    1000
AH‐1W / AH‐1Z Super Cobra 135 10,000    317
HH‐1N / UH‐1N / UH‐1Y Twin Huey 110 10,000    230















An aircraft’s greatest role in HADR operations is serving as the connecting 
platform between land and supporting vessels, and conducting SAR missions.  The most 
important information that we used in our analysis is an aircraft’s lift capability, 
personnel transportation capability, and range.  The information from Table 10 enabled 
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F. DISASTER RESPONSES 
Data on the USN and MSC responses to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, on 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and on the Haiti earthquake in 2010 came from a variety of 
sources.  Some sources that record ship response dates held conflicting information.  
When there was a conflict between a civilian source and an official military record, data 
from the official military record was used.  If there was conflicting data between two 
civilian sources, an attempt was made to find additional sources to support each of the 
conflicting sources.  Once three separate civilian sources corroborated the data, it was 
considered accurate and compiled for use in our disaster time lines. 
1. Disaster Response Time Lines 
Tables 11–13 display the USN and MSC responses to the Indian Ocean tsunami 
in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the Haiti earthquake in 2010 by detailing the 
names of the ships that responded and the time line of each response.  Each table begins 
with the first day that a ship from either the USN or MSC was assigned to disaster 
response and ends with the last official day of the response effort.  A cell is shaded light 
gray if the ship was ordered to respond, preparing to get underway, or en route to the 
disaster area on the corresponding day.  A cell is dark gray if the ship was on location and 
responding to the disaster.  A black cell indicates the day each ship was released from the 
HADR response for unrelated mission tasking. 
 
Table 11. Time Line of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Response 
(Elleman, 2007; Global Security, 2006a; Global Security, 2006b; Lefebvre, 2005; USPACOM, 2005) 
Type Name Platform 26     27     28     29     30     31     1       2       3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10    11      12      13      14    15    16    17    18      19      20      21      22    23    24    25    26    27    28    29    30    31    1      2      3      4   5     6     7     8     9     10  11 12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20   21  22   23   24   25   26   27   28   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10  11 12  13  14  15  16 
USS SHILOH CG U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS BUNKER HILL CG U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CV/CVN U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS BENFOLD DDG U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS SHOUP DDGIIA U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS MILIUS DDG U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS THACH FFG U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS SWIFT HSV U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
MV WESTPAC EXPRESS HSV U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS BONHOMME RICHARD LHD U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS ESSEX LHD U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS DULUTH LPD U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS RUSHMORE LSD U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS FORT MCHENRY LSD U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS LOUISVILLE SSN U U U U U U U U
USS PASADENA SSN U U U U
USNS SAN JOSE T‐AFS U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS CONCORD T‐AFS U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS NIAGRA FALLS T‐AFS U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS JOHN MCDONNELL T‐AGS U U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS MERCY T‐AH U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS 1ST LT JACK LUMMUS T‐AK U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X U U X X X X X X O
USNS MAJ. STEPHEN W. PLESS T‐AK U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS CPL. LOUIS J. HAUGE JR. T‐AK U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS PFC. JAMES ANDERSON JR. T‐AK U U X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS 1ST LT. HARRY L. MARTIN T‐AK X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS 1ST LT ALEX BONNYMAN T‐AK U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS TIPPECANOE T‐AO X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS RAINER T‐AOE U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
Unified Assistance ‐ IO 2004 February MarchDecember January
 
Table 12. Time Line of the Hurricane Katrina Response 
(Inspector General, 2006; USNORTHCOM, 2005) 
Type Name Platform 28    29    30    31   1   2    3    4    5      6      7      8      9      10    11    12    13    14    15    16    17    18    19    20    21   22    23    24    25    26    27    28    29    30    1      2      3      4    5   6    7   8   
CRUISE SENSATION CRUISE U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
CRUISE HOLIDAY CRUISE U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
CRUISE ECSTASY CRUISE U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
CRUISE SCOTIA PRINCE CRUISE U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS JOHN F KENNEDY CV/CVN U
USS HARRY S TRUMAN CV/CVN U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS SWIFT HSV U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS BATAAN LHD X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS IWO JIMA LHD U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X H R R R X X X X X X X X X X O
USS SHREVEPORT LPD U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X H R R R X X X X X X X X X X O
USS TORTUGA LSD U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X H R R R X X X X X X X X X X O
USS WHIDBEY ISLAND LSD U U U U X X X X X X X X X O
USS SCOUT MCM/MHC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS DEFENDER MCM/MHC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS GLADIATOR MCM/MHC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS PIONEER MCM/MHC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS AVENGER MCM/MHC X X X X X X X O
USS CHIEF MCM/MHC X X X O
USS FALCON MCM/MHC X X X X X X X X X O
USS CORMORANT MCM/MHC X X X O
USS BLACK HAWK MCM/MHC X X X O
USNS COMFORT T‐AH U U U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X H H R R X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS BELLATRIX T‐AKR U U U U U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X H X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS ALTAIR T‐AKR U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS PILLILAU T‐AKR U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X H X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS BOB HOPE T‐AKR U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X O
USNS ARGOL T‐AKR U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X H X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS POLLUX T‐AKR X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X H X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS RED CLOUD T‐AKR U U U U U U U U X X X X O
USNS CAPE VINCENT T‐AKR X O
USNS PATUXENT T‐AO X X X X X X X X X X R R R X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS ARCTIC T‐AOE U U X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS SUPPLY T‐AOE X X X X X X O





Table 13. Time Line of the Haiti Earthquake Response 
(Buzby, 2010; Cook, 2010; Patrick 2010; Schulte, 2010; Seal, 2010; U.S. Fleet Forces Command [USFFC], 2010a, 2010b) 
Type Name Platform 12    13    14    15    16    17    18    19    20      21      22      23      24      25      26      27      28      29      30      31      1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10      11      12      13      14      15      16      17      18      19      20      21      22      23      24      25      26      27      28      1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10     11     12     13     14     15     16     17     18     19     20     21     22     23     24    
USS NORMANDY CG U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS BUNKER HILL CG X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS CARL VINSON CV/CVN U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS HIGGINS DDG U U X X X X X X X X X X X X O
FERRY HUAKAI FERRY U U U X X X X O U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS UNDERWOOD FFG U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS NASSAU LHA U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS BATAAN LHD U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS KEARSARGE LHD U
USS MESA VERDE LPD U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS FORT McHENRY LSD U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS CARTER HALL LSD U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS GUNSTON HALL LSD U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS ASHLAND LSD U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS CORNHUSKER STATE T‐ACS U U U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS GOPHER STATE T‐ACS U U U X X X X X X X X X O
USNS HENSON T‐AGS X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS COMFORT T‐AH U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS 1ST LT JACK LUMMUS T‐AK U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS PFC DEWAYNE T. WILLIAMS T‐AK U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS SACAGAWEA T‐AKE U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X O U U U U U U X X X X X X O
USNS LEWIS AND CLARK T‐AKE U U U U U U X X X X X O X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS CAPE MAY T‐AKR U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS BIG HORN T‐AO U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O U U U X X O
USNS LEROY GRUMMAN T‐AO U U U U U U U U U U U X X X X O
USNS GRASP T‐ARS U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
TUG CARIBE PIONEER/FOSS 343 TUG‐BAR U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
TUG ELSBETH II/BB‐110 TUG‐BAR U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
TUB ALLIE B/MEMPHIS BRIDGE TUG‐BAR X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
TUG VICTORIA HUNT TUG X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
TUG McALLISTER BOYS/ATLANTIC TRADER (T/B) TUG‐BAR U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
Unified Response ‐ Haiti January February March
 
 
 In the next chapter, we use the presence or absence of a ship at a disaster response to help analyze each response and to 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. LINKING USN MISSIONS TO SHIP PLATFORMS 
 Linking missions to specific USN and MSC platforms provides a comparison of 
different vessels and their abilities to respond to disasters in different ways.  In Chapter 
IV, we identified common disaster traits.  We then developed mission categories linked 
to disaster traits.  The last step is to link missions to USN and MSC platforms according 
to their capabilities.  Linking characteristics of USN and MSC platforms to basic mission 
requests illustrates which USN and MSC are best suited to conduct HADR operations. 
 The link between missions and ship platform capabilities is made using a three-
step classification system.  The classification system is defined in Table 14.  
Table 14. Capability Label Classifications 
Empty Circle 0 The vessel has little no capability to conduct the specified mission
Half Filled Circle 1 The vessel has some capability to conduct the specified mission
Filled Circle 2 The vessel is very capable in conducting the specified mission  
 
1. Capability Determination 
We had to determine each ship’s capability to perform each mission related to 
HADR operations.  It is difficult to place a quantitative value on how much better one 
class of ship conducts a mission than another class of ship.  To avoid assignment of 
arbitrary quantitative values, a platform’s capability is assigned one of three qualitative 
descriptions that are ordinally scaled with respect to each mission: little to no capability, 
some capability, very capable.  In determining the capability for each ship, we had to set 
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 Establishment of capability classifications allowed us to develop a full assessment 
of platforms for all missions.  The parameters were compared to the characteristics listed 
in Appendices A and B.  This comparison allowed us to assign each platform a score 
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ability to conduct both critical and non-critical HADR missions.  In the following 
sections, we break down each platform and its ability to conduct HADR missions based 
on USN and MSC ship characteristics and capability parameter definitions.  Capability 
comparison tables for Landing Crafts and Seaborne Aircrafts can be seen in Appendix D. 
2. USN Platforms 
In Table 16, we have linked USN ship platforms to their capabilities to conduct 
HADR missions, within our defined capability parameters. 
 
















































CVN (Nimitz) 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
CVN (Enterprise) 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
LHD 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 0
LHA 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 0
LCC 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
LPD (San Antonio) 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
LPD (Austin) 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
LSD (Harpers  Ferry) 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
LSD (Whidby Island) 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
CG 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
DDG (FLT I & II) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
DDG (FLT IIA) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
Frigates 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
LCS (Freedom) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
LCS (Independence) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
PC 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1






















































































































































 Table 16 highlights the effectiveness of various USN platforms in their ability to 
conduct HADR missions.  Table 16 shows different platforms broken down into the 
groups of Aircraft Carriers (CVN) Amphibious Ships (AMPHIBS), CRUDES (CG, 
DDG, and FFG), and Other (LCS, PC and MCM).  The table clearly shows aircraft 
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3. MSC Platforms 
In Table 17, we have linked MSC ship platforms to their capabilities to conduct 
HADR missions, within our defined capability parameters. 
 
















































T‐AOE 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
T‐AO 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
T‐AE 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
T‐AKE 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
T‐ARS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
T‐ATF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
T‐AH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
LCC 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
AS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
T‐AGOS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
T‐AGS (Survey) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
T‐AGS (Nav) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T‐AGM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T‐ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
LMSR 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
MPS 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
MPF Container 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T‐AOT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T‐AK (USAF) 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T‐AK (USA) 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T‐AVB 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
OPDS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Break‐Bulk 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HSV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
LMSR 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T‐5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Common Use Tanker 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dry Cargo 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fast Sealift Ship 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
RO/RO ships 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Crane Ships 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lighterage‐aboard ships 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OPDT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Break‐Bulk Ships 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0















































































































































































do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 59 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
B. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Vessel to Capability Comparison table lays out an easy-to-understand 
comparison of vessels and their ability to conduct HADR operations.  To highlight some 
key aspects of the table, we will discuss the advantages of some vessels while also 
acknowledging limitations of some vessels.  For organizational purposes, we have broken 
the observations down into USN vessels and MSC vessels.  The observations we have 
noted in this section will help in developing response recommendations for future HADR 
operations. 
1. USN Observations 
 The overarching theme of USN support during HADR operations is its ability to 
transfer cargo via aircraft and landing craft and its ability to provide personnel support, 
berthing capacity, and medical support.  While USN vessels are very capable at the 
transportation aspect of the HADR mission, they do lack in their ability to carry excess 
cargo, to include dry goods, refrigerated goods, fresh water, or roll-on-roll-off cargo.  
One of the key takeaways for the USN observations is the high capability of 
amphibious vessels to conduct HADR missions.  The amphibious vessels excel in their 
ability to conduct aircraft support, landing craft support, SAR, personnel transfers, 
berthing capability, and medical support.  The big deck ships (CVN, LHD, and LHAs) 
are also extremely capable of providing personnel support, berthing capacity, and 
medical support.  The table shows us that among USN vessels, the most capable and 
effective vessels for HADR mission are amphibious ships.   
On the other side of the coin, we see the limits that CRUDES and other USN 
vessels have in conducting HADR operations.  CRUDES vessels that have embarked 
helicopters (CG, DDG, FLT, IIA, and FFG) can provide some aircraft support, SAR 
capability, personnel transportations, and personnel support; however, those are the only 
critical missions that CRUDES vessels can conduct.  The vessels described as “other” 
(LCS, PC, and MCM) are even more limited in conducting HADR missions and provide 
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2. MSC Observations 
 The biggest advantage of the MSC fleet is its ability to carry a high quantity of 
cargo to and from the disaster region.  In Table 17, we see that a majority of full circles 
lie in the Cargo Capacity category.  The MSC fleet is designed around providing supplies 
to the military, and therefore, it is of no surprise that the fleet is extremely capable in 
supporting the HADR mission by providing essential supplies to the affected area.  In 
addition to its cargo capacity characteristic, MSC also has two hospital ships (T-AH) in 
its inventory.  The hospital ships are probably the most recognized and desired ships 
during disaster relief operations because they are floating hospitals.  The hospital ship 
provides a high level of medical support, along with a high capability to produce fresh 
water, berthing capacity, and personnel support.    
 While MSC is great at bringing supplies to the disaster region, it is limited in its 
ability to conduct other HADR missions.  Very few MSC vessels have embarked 
helicopters, and they are, therefore, not very capable at conducting SAR missions and/or 
aircraft support.  Another aspect of the MSC fleet is that a majority of the crew is 
composed of civilian mariners (CIVMAR) in a very small crew size.  The small crews do 
not allow for a good level of personnel support during HADR missions.  Beyond the 
hospital ships, the MSC fleet does not have a good capability to conduct medical support.  
Another setback for MSC in conducting HADR missions is its specialty vessels.  For 
example, the T-AGS navigation ship is designed to provide navigation testing and 
support for USN submarines.  Specialty mission vessels’ characteristics essentially 
eliminate their ability to conduct HADR missions.   
3. Response Recommendations 
 In this section, we identified which vessels are better suited to conduct HADR 
operations and we discussed which vessels have little to no capability to conduct HADR 
missions.  Of USN vessels, we can clearly see that aircraft carriers and amphibious ships 
are the best ships at conducting HADR operations.  At the same time, we can see little to 
no use for CRUDES and “other” ships during HADR missions.  The limitation of USN 
ships is the ability to carry cargo, and therefore, there must be support from MSC to 
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vessels that can transport dry goods, refrigerated goods, and fresh water and that can be 
self-sustaining.  Beyond cargo capacity, the use of the MSC hospital ships greatly 
benefits the USN’s ability to conduct medical support in the affected area.  It is to be 
noted that in the MSC fleet, there are several specialty ships that provide little to no 
HADR capability, and we recommend that these ships not be employed in the response 
plan. 
C. ACTUAL USN AND MSC DISASTER RESPONSES 
This project did not undertake the task of assigning quantitative values to USN 
and MSC assets’ abilities to accomplish different HADR missions.  We did not determine 
that one ship is twice as good or 33% better than another.  We chose a qualitative 
categorization approach to allow for relative comparisons between overall response 
patterns, without forcing an arbitrary measurement of how much “better” one ship is than 
another.  Our qualitative analysis of ships’ capabilities considered two variables: the 
number of ships supporting a mission and the general categorization of capability they 
provide.  This process enabled a big-picture view of response efforts, without getting 
hung up on details of capability levels. 
The process we used to determine a ship’s qualitative contribution to a given 
HADR mission was discussed in detail previously and is summarized in Figure 16 for 


















Figure 16. Process for Determining a Ship’s Capability for a Mission 
After determining USN and MSC platform capabilities for HADR missions, we 
used the disaster time lines from Tables 11–13 to characterize the responses to the three 
disasters.  By combining time lines—which indicated a ship’s presence at the disaster on 
a given day—and the qualitative values of the ship’s mission capabilities, we were able to 
determine the response effort’s qualitative contribution to each HADR mission. 
Based on the mission capability parameters defined in Table 15, we assigned each 
ship a mission capability value of 0 if it possessed little to no capability of performing a 
mission, a value of 1 if it had some capability, and a value of 2 if it was very capable of 
performing a mission.  Again, these values were not intended to indicate an exact 
measure of a vessel’s capability; they merely indicate the ship’s capability category for a 
given mission using an ordinal scale. A ship with a mission capability of 1 is not 
necessarily half as capable as a ship with a 2; it is merely less capable by such a degree 
that we placed it in a lower category.  For example, there is a stark difference between a 
ship with no landing craft support capability (0) and a ship with some capability (1).  
There is less difference between some capability (1) and very capable (2), which may just 
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By determining which ships were present at a disaster response on a given day 
and using the ships’ mission capability values, we were able to determine a qualitative 
and relative degree of support provided to the different HADR missions.  For every day 
of disaster response, we added all mission capability values from ships that were present 
on the specified day of the response to arrive at a composite capability value.  For 
example, if only one ship was present at a disaster and it had a mission capability of 1 for 
Aircraft Support, then the mission’s composite capability for that day was 1.  If another 
ship with a mission capability score of 2 for Aircraft Support was present, then the 
mission’s composite capability for that day was the sum of 3.  We used composite 
capability for each day and each mission to analyze response patterns. 
We have created time lines of each mission’s composite capability levels for each 
disaster and have formatted the cells with the greatest contribution (by composite 
capability) to appear completely black and the cells with no contribution to appear 
completely white.  The values that appear in the cells are the composite capabilities for 
given days. 
1. Intraresponse Analyses 
a. Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2004 
Figure 17 displays the mission composite capabilities each day for each 
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Figure 17. Mission Composite Capabilities: Indian Ocean Tsunami 
 
The response to the Indian Ocean tsunami lasted 81 days.  The first 
substantial increase in composite capability occurred about two weeks into the effort.  
Nearly all USN and MSC support for the response effort was completed by Day 41. 
Table 18 shows that the peak of cumulative mission composite capability 
occurred on Day 24 of the response effort and the peak range of support occurred from 
Day 15 to Day 35.  From greatest to least, the five missions that received the most 
support were dry goods cargo, aircraft support, fuel cargo, self-sufficient cargo handling, 
and fresh water cargo. 
The response effort was executed using a CSG and ESG operating model, 
including the presence of one submarine with each group (Elleman, 2007).  From the 
U.S. Navy’s point of view, this was a uniquely international response effort covering a 
tremendous amount of territory.  The USN and MSC responded all across the Indian 
Ocean but focused the bulk of their response efforts on western Indonesia (Lefebvre, 
2005). 
 
Table 18. Mission Composite Capability Time Line: I-Ocean Tsunami 
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b. Response to Hurricane Katrina, 2005 
Figure 18 displays the mission composite capabilities each day for each 
HADR mission over the entire response to Hurricane Katrina. 
 




































Figure 18. Mission Composite Capabilities: Hurricane Katrina 
 
The response to Hurricane Katrina lasted 42 days.  The first substantial 
increase in composite capability occurred about two weeks into the effort.  Nearly all 
USN and MSC support for the response effort was complete by Day 38. 
Table 19 shows that the peak of cumulative mission composite capacity of 
the response occurred on Day 17 of the response effort and the peak range of support 
occurred from Day 10 to Day 23.  From greatest to least, the five missions that received 
greatest support were berthing capacity, self-sufficient cargo handling, fresh water cargo, 
dry goods cargo, and fuel cargo. 
Hurricane Rita struck the Gulf Coast when the response to Katrina was 
about two-thirds complete, causing a number of ships to leave the Gulf of Mexico and go 
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Minesweepers stationed in Texas, combined with the need to corral oil rigs knocked 
adrift in both hurricanes, created an opportunity for good use of a platform we did not 
identify as particularly capable in HADR operations.  The response to Hurricane Katrina 
was based on a JTF model and focused on southern Florida, where Katrina crossed the 
state, and also crossed Louisiana and Mississippi, which took the brunt of the force of the 
hurricane’s landfall (USNORTHCOM, 2005).  The USN and MSC response to Hurricane 
Katrina was quickly truncated rather than tapered down due to the large presence of DoS 
and NGO actors who were able to assume roles originally filled by the military and to a 
strong desire to push management of the disaster to a local level (CRS, 2005). 
 
 
Table 19. Mission Composite Capability Time Line: Hurricane Katrina 
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c. Response to the Haiti Earthquake, 2010 
Figure 19 displays the mission composite capabilities each day for each 
HADR mission over the entire response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010. 
 




































Figure 19. Mission Composite Capabilities: Haiti Earthquake 
 
The response to the Haiti earthquake lasted 72 days.  Nearly all USN and 
MSC support for the response effort was complete by Day 41.  The first substantial 
increase in composite capability occurred about two weeks into the effort.  USN and 
MSC support for the response effort tapered off gradually from the peak of the effort to 
the end of the official response. 
Table 20 shows that the peak of cumulative mission composite capacity of 
the response occurred on Day 19 of the response effort and the peak range of support 
occurred from Day 12 to Day 28.  From greatest to least, the five missions that received 
greatest support were aircraft support, dry goods cargo, search and rescue, self-sufficient 
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The response to the earthquake in Haiti contained significant international 








Table 20. Mission Composite Capability Time Line: Haiti Earthquake 
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2. Cross-Response Analysis  
We examined disaster responses to a tsunami, a hurricane, and an earthquake.  We 
noticed a number of trends within the data.  Many departures from trends were explained 
by the unique nature of a given disaster and the unique demands and opportunities 
commanders faced in structuring their responses. 
a. Ship Composition Comparison 
The fewest number of ships used in a disaster response was 29; the largest 
number was 34.  Overall, USN and MSC ship volume per response was consistent.  The 
USN always sent fewer ships than MSC provided.  There were some departures from 
trends that are worth noting, however. 
Submarines were present at only the tsunami response, and no record was 
found of either of the two present submarines contributing to an identified HADR 
mission (Elleman, 2007; Global Security, 2006a, 2006b; Lefebvre, 2005; USPACOM, 
2005).  Similarly, the mission capabilities where CGs, DDGs, and FFGs have some 
capability are duplicated or surpassed by assets that also excel at still more mission 
capabilities.  We conclude that the absence of CGs, DDGs, and FFGs from a response 
effort would not significantly decrease the total capability provided to a given HADR 
mission area and that freeing these ships from HADR missions to which they are poorly 
suited would provide CCDRs with more available assets for other missions. 
Hospital ships (T-AHs) are not kept in a ready status, and MSC only has 
two of them (MSC, 2010).  As a result, there is a significant delay in the arrival of these 
ships on location to assist a response, as happened in the response to Katrina 
(USNORTHCOM, 2005), unless they happen to be underway in the area already, simply 
by chance, as happened in the response to the Haiti earthquake (Patrick, 2010). 
Table 21 displays the number of ships used in each disaster response, 
broken down into groups of similarly capable ships.  The disasters are listed in 
chronological order, displaying the change in the number of ships used from one disaster 
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SSN  2  ‐2  0  0  0 
T‐AH  1  0  1  0  1 
CV/CVN  1  +1  2  ‐1  1 
LHA/LHD  2  0  2  +1  3 
MCM/MHC  0  +9  9  ‐9  0 
CG/DDG/FFG  6  ‐6  0  +4  4 
LPD/LSD  3  0  3  +2  5 
MSC/Misc (w/o T‐AH)  14  +3  17  0  17 
USN  14  +2  16  ‐3  13 
MSC/Contracted  15  +3  18     18 
TOTAL SHIPS  29  +5  34  ‐3  31 
 
b. Commonly Supported Missions 
Dry Goods Cargo and Self-Sufficient Cargo Handling were among the top 
five most supported mission capabilities in all three disaster responses.  Aircraft Support, 
Fuel Cargo and Fresh Water Cargo appeared in the top five for two responses each. 
c. Unique Circumstances 
Berthing Capacity (in the Katrina response) missions and Search and 
Rescue and Personnel Support missions (in the Haiti earthquake response) only received 
“top five” support once among all three disasters.  MSC consistently provided ships to fill 
unforeseen needs, such as the rental of four entire cruise ships for berthing space during 
the Katrina response (Inspector General, 2006) and three integrated tug and barge 
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d. Peak Response and Peak Time Frames 
Table 22 displays the cumulative mission composite capability for each 
disaster response, shading higher levels of mission support.  Figure 20 graphs the same 
values versus the day of the response effort.  Both Table 22 and Figure 20 show there is 
significantly more composite capacity support for HADR missions from the USN and 
MSC early in a mission response time line. 
 
Table 22. Cumulative Mission Composite Capability Time Line 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
0 0 0 0 53 53 53 53 90 90 90 90 102 114 136 168 201 201 201 213 213 213 213 233 224 188 188 144 144 123 123 135 135 145 133 126 126 102 102 90 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0
20 20 20 30 32 32 64 96 134 136 164 174 212 212 212 212 226 196 196 194 172 172 158 34 80 80 80 146 146 146 146 156 156 156 156 142 156 10 10 10 10 0
0 0 1 29 33 37 97 97 109 118 130 174 174 174 173 173 173 164 192 192 182 172 182 191 183 173 173 185 132 146 134 124 124 124 124 124 112 117 117 117 117 127 127 118 110 100 100 100 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 83 61 61 61 45 45 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 20 20 0
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Peak response efforts for each disaster occurred on Day 24 (Indian Ocean 
tsunami), Day 17 (Katrina), and Day 19 (Haiti earthquake).  We identified that the 
beginning of peak ranges of support occurred on Days 15, 10, and 12.  We identified that 
the endings to peak ranges of support occurred on Days 35, 23, and 28.  A pattern 
emerges in the location of the starting of a peak support range, the peak, and the point 
where support levels decline significantly.  Typically, support is ramped up in the first 
two weeks of a response and then begins to level out as it peaks, usually near the end of 
the third week.  After peaking, it slowly tapers down until a point where there is a sudden 
decrease in support, usually at the end of the fourth week of the response effort.  Despite 
the dramatic drop in support after the peak range, the overall support level decreases 
much more gradually than the increase seen in ramp-up. 
3. Validation of Pettit and Beresford’s Model of Emergency Recovery  
 Figure 20 and Table 22 provide an indication that there is a typical “shape” of 
USN and MSC disaster responses.  To create a smoother picture of this shape, we 
averaged the cumulative mission composite capability provided across all HADR mission 
areas for each day, for each disaster.  We graphed these values and drew a free-hand 
curve to represent the basic shape of the relationship between mission capability and time 
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Figure 21. General “Shape” of USN and MSC Disaster Response Efforts 
 
 The general shape of USN and MSC support of HADR missions in the responses 
to the Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the Haiti earthquake in 2010 is easy 
to recognize.  Although the project objective was not to validate the Pettit and Beresford 
(2005) model, it is an exact match for their proposed model of emergency recovery.  A 
more complete overlay of Pettit and Beresford’s (2005) model, with all elements relevant 
to USN and MSC response, is shown with the average of cumulative mission composite 
















































Figure 22. An Overlay of Average U.S. Navy and MSC Cumulative Mission 
Capabilities Provided for Three Disasters and Part of Pettit and Beresford’s (2005) 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. INCREASING NUMBER OF DISASTERS AND HADR OPERATIONS 
Since the 1970s, there has been a marked increase in the number of deaths and 
disasters reported each year (EM-DAT, 2011).  A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower (DoN, 2007) links seapower to other elements of national strength and 
designates HADR operations to be equally important as combat operations.  It also 
recognizes that a measurable majority of the world’s population lives near coastlines 
(DoN, 2007).  Destruction from hurricanes and tsunamis will always be most devastating 
along coastlines, due to the nature of these disasters, and many coastlines are formed 
along tectonic plate fault lines, which increases the chance that the USN and MSC will 
need to respond to tsunamis, hurricanes, and earthquakes. 
B. CONSISTENT RESPONSE PATTERNS 
Evaluating responses to a tsunami, a hurricane, and an earthquake yielded 
surprising consistency in USN and MSC responses.  One hospital ship was used in each 
response.  More MSC than USN assets were employed in each response.  The number of 
amphibious assets employed was usually much larger than CRUDES, and the one 
occurrence where it was not larger is explained by the strict CSG and ESG structure used 
for the response.  The number of ships used in each response varied little.  The peak 
levels of mission capabilities did not vary greatly from one response to another.  
Typically, USN and MSC mission support started peaking two weeks into a response 
effort, fully peaked at three weeks, then rapidly declined, and finally tapered off until the 
end of an operation. 
C. PLATFORM CONCLUSIONS 
1. Platform Considerations 
One of the goals of this project has been to define platform capability in 
conducting HADR operations.  Tables 16 and 17 can be used as a tool in determining 
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combination of vessels are required to cover the full range of missions that HADR 
operations require.  The analysis of our observations has shown that amphibious vessels 
are the best platforms to conduct HADR operations.  The analysis has also shown the 
limitations that the USN vessels have in conducting the full range of HADR missions.  
Based on these observations, we conclude that those vessels that can conduct lift 
operations and provide medical and personnel support are best suited, while those vessels 
that are limited in their ability to conduct those missions are not well suited for HADR 
missions.  There is much debate about the usefulness and need for amphibious ships in 
the future, and we believe that they serve a vital role in HADR operations that cannot be 
filled by other vessels.  
2. Task Force Composition and Force Structure 
The USN fleet is comprised of CSGs, ESGs, ARGs, and SSGs.  The structure of 
these groups is effective in conducting major campaign operations but tends to be 
overkill for HADR operations.  In the case of Unified Assistance, the USN deployed full 
ESGs, which resulted in tasking several CRUDES vessels to support the HADR mission.  
As discussed earlier, CRUDES vessels provide little assistance in HADR operations and, 
therefore, were being underutilized for their entire time on station.  For future HADR 
operations, it would be advisable for the CCDRs to form a HADR Task Force comprised 
of amphibious vessels and MSC vessels.  A Task Force should be able to conduct all 
required HADR missions with only the most effective platforms.    
3. Design of HADR Vessel 
Due to the increase in worldwide disasters and the increased desired to conduct 
HADR missions in the Navy, it may be beneficial to design and develop a platform that is 
centered on HADR operations.  The project could serve as a useful tool in defining the 
parameters in which the vessel should be able to perform.  The critical capabilities 
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D. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
The response to Hurricane Katrina provides an obvious caveat to our proposed 
force structure for HADR operations.  Commanders must recognize unique situations and 
make use of the assets on hand.  The presence of nine MCM and MHC platforms in the 
Gulf of Mexico provided commanders with immediately available assets that might not 
have been ideal for typical disaster response missions but that were capable of an atypical 
mission: locating and corralling drifting oil rigs (USNORTHCOM, 2005).  Another 
special consideration in HADR operations is the use of nuclear-reactor-qualified 
personnel in gaining stability to the affected reactors in Japan after the tsunami on March 
11, 2011.  In this incident, we have an example of a very unique situation in which the 
USN can play a vital role in assisting the affected population. 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Limits to our research and its applicability indicate a number of areas in which 
further research is recommended, as summarized in Table 23. 
 
Table 23. Future Research Recommendations 
Determine a quantitative method of comparing the utility of one ship to 
another in HADR operations 
Conduct a more in-depth analysis of these three disasters to determine exactly 
which HADR mission areas each type of asset supported, and conduct a 
capability analysis at this level 
Construct an optimization model based on ship characteristics to determine 
the best composition of a JTF for disaster relief.  Suggested maximum 
constraints (or minimization goals) would be asset cost (perhaps by daily fuel 
burn cost), total number of ships assigned, and number of personnel assigned.  
Suggested minimum constraints could include operating rooms, berthing 
space, and cumulative pounds of airlift capacity.  Decision variables would 
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APPENDIX A 
Observed USN Ship Characteristics: 
Ship Type  
Abbreviation 
Class Name 
Number of vessels in class 
Hull numbers 
Location (home port) 
Size:  
Length (ft) 
 Beam (ft) 
 Draft (ft) 
 Displacement (metric tons) 
Max Speed (knots) 
Crew Size: 
 Ship’s Company 
 Air Wing detachment 
 Marine Detachment 
Aircraft Support: (number of aircraft that the vessel has embarked and/or can 
support) 
Helicopters: 
CH-46 Sea Knight 
  CH-53 Sea Stallion 
  UH-1N Huey 
  AH-1W Super Cobra 
  HH-60H 
  SH-60F Seahawk 
  SH-60B Seahawk 
  MH-60 
 Fixed-Wing: 
AV-8B Harrier 
  MV-22 Osprey 
  F/A-18 Hornet 
  EA-6B Prowler 
  E-2C Hawkeye 
Landing Craft: (number of Landing Craft that the vessel has embarked and/or can 
support) 
LCAC / LCU 
 AAV 
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APPENDIX B 
Observed MSC Ship Characteristics: 
Ship Type 
Class type 
Number in class 
Hull numbers 
Location (home port) 
Size: 
 Length (ft) 
 Beam (ft) 
 Draft (ft) 
 Displacement (metric tons) 
Max Speed (knots) 
Crew Size: 
 Civil Service 
 Military Detachment 
Cargo Capability: 
Fuel (bbls) 
 Ammunition (tons) 
 Vehicles (sq ft) 
 Dry Cargo: 
Tons 
  Pallets 
 Refrigerated stores: 
Tons 
  Frozen (pallets) 
  Chill (pallets) 
 Water (gal) 
Operational Capabilities (ship characteristics that are relevant to the HADR operations) 
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APPENDIX C 










135 29 8.5 200 375 11 1200 @ 8 kts 14 170 N/A
Landing Craft, Mechanized LCM 8 73.7 21 5.2 N/A 105 12 190 @ 9 kts 5 180 N/A
Landing Craft, Mechanized LCM 6 56.2 14 4 N/A 64 9 130 @ 9kts 5 34 N/A
2.9 / 0.3 87.2













































































LCAC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
LCU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCM (8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0









































































































































































SH‐60B 1 1 1 1 2 1
SH‐60F 1 0 1 1 2 1
MH‐60R 1 1 1 1 1 1
MH‐60S 1 1 1 1 2 1
HH‐60H  1 1 1 1 2 1
CH‐46E 2 2 1 1 1 1
CH‐53D 2 2 1 1 0 1
CH‐53E 2 2 1 1 0 1
MH‐53E 2 2 1 1 0 1
AH‐1W / AH‐1Z 0 0 1 0 1 1
HH‐1N / UH‐1N / UH‐1Y 0 1 1 0 2 1
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